CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

concern in both the 2003 Iraq war and NATO’s ongoing counter-insurgency fight in
Afghanistan.
The issue of risk-transference has perhaps never been better exemplified that by the
tactics employed by the US and NATO in Afghanistan. Standard practice when ground
forces have come under attack from insurgents has been to attempt to stand-off and call
in CAS. This carries a much reduced risk to the ground forces than would close combat
with the insurgents but also carries a much greater risk to civilians. The insurgents have
been quick to exploit the propaganda opportunities this affords, highlighting and
doubtless exaggerating civilian casualties and, indeed, deliberately using local civilians
as a shield. So serious was the perception of the civilian casualties NATO/US forces
were causing that by mid-2007, Afghan President Hamid Karzai publicly rebuked the
Allies and wrote to NATO’s theatre commander to demand a change in tactics. As an
example of the sort of media reporting that preceded Karzai’s letter, the following
appeared in the UK’s Guardian in mid-June 2007:
Recently in Sangin an estimated 21 civilians were killed by bombs dropped from
Nato planes after US and British soldiers were ambushed. In the eastern city of
Jalalabad in March, US soldiers shot dead 19 civilians in the aftermath of a
bomb attack. And yesterday seven policemen were killed by "friendly fire" in an
air strike in the eastern province of Nangarhar.
The Jalalabad shootings may yet be deemed a war crime, but civilian deaths are
normally tragic accidents. Often outnumbered and outgunned by militia men, the
immediate response of Nato troops is to call on overwhelming firepower
delivered by artillery, helicopter gunships and jets. The troops aren't wicked,
they're just keen on staying alive. But these weapons are blunt-edged and
indiscriminate. The price of overwhelming firepower is the death of nearby
civilians. 83
Whilst the insurgent claims of civilian casualties were almost certainly inflated,
Karzai’s letter to the Commander of ISAF included an analysis conducted by the
Afghan National Directorate of Security. This assessed that in the five preceding
months 169 civilians had been killed and 142 wounded as a result of NATO/US
operations. 84
The issue was also addressed above (see Section 4.2.1.3) in considering how risk
aversion could impact on conduct of operations. The result is that a reliance on
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