CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

Nor does the expectation of being held to account always preclude heinous acts of
barbarism among soldiers even of ‘civilized’ nations. Whether the British after
Badajoz, the Germans and the Russians on the Eastern Front, Americans at My Lai or
Canadians in Somalia * , atrocities happen. However, these are recognised as atrocities,
as aberrations in the way we expect armies to behave, as breaches in the codes, both
formal and informal, of discipline and honour that are at the core of professional
soldiering. The very fact that they stand out to us identifies that we generally accept
them as things that should not happen. This, like the high-level approbation leveled at
Dyer’s actions, further supports the claim that it is not a new phenomenon that soldiers
be held to account for their actions, especially in conflicts that fall outside the morally
more clear-cut framework of conventional army vs army war.
In conventional, symmetric conflict we might argue that reciprocity is a driver for
abidance by rules. Clearly, though, it is not a driver in asymmetric conflict; however
decent we are, the tactics of the irregular will not be favourably influenced; at essence
there he seeks advantage from what has been described as a ‘moral asymmetry’ 128 ; we
abide by the rules whilst he does not. The arguments advanced in Chapter 2, and
recapped above in support of the warriors code (See p282), are equally applicable in
asymmetric war, albeit sometimes harder for the regular to understand. Moreover, from
an instrumental perspective there are examples throughout history where oppressive or
over violent conduct by governments, whether or not in response to the provocation of
asymmetric opponents, and whether an act of deliberate policy or from unofficial and
ill-disciplined acts by a minority, has had entirely negative outcome for them. The
action of British troops at Lexington and Concord in 1775, and the deliberate burning
first of Falmouth MA and then Norfolk VA, did much to turn the American Revolution
from a localised rebellion into a war of independence. In 1919, Dyer’s action in
Amritsar helped turn millions of peace-loving, patient and loyal supporters of the Raj
* In support of an earlier point, it is worth noting that all bar the first of these cases involve at least a
degree of asymmetry provoking brutal response by regulars. In the first case there is still a case to be
made that it was the frustration of receiving casualties whilst unable – for a considerable time – to hit
back, coupled with a belief that the besieged population had sided with their French occupiers – that
explains – not excuses – the British rampage.
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