CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

political will is robustness in Rules of Engagement (RoE). * Whilst these may be
relatively straightforward in the conflict phase, post-conflict they can be more complex.
There is some argument that UK forces in Iraq have had to operate within the constraint
of especially restrictive RoE, imposed not just to ensure proportionality and
discrimination, but because the UK government fears both domestic and international
political fall-out from greater civilian casualties should more robust RoE be allowed.
However, more robust RoE, and a readiness to accept the civilian casualties that are an
unfortunate concomitant of war, may be necessary both for force protection and mission
success. Richard Holmes gives the following examples from the experience of British
soldiers in Iraq: ‘… in the midst of what was evidently a substantial firefight, a military
police officer ran about urging soldiers to fire only aimed shots. …’ and ‘shooting an
insurgent who had been involved in an ambush, but had jettisoned his weapon before
running away from the ambush site, would have breached the rules. Shooting him if he
had retained his weapon, however, would not.’ 155 It should be noted that senior British
commanders have insisted that their RoE are entirely adequate 156 but whether or not UK
soldiers in Iraq have adequate RoE, the point remains that as a measure of political will
RoE in interventions must be appropriate (including appropriately robust) as part of a
demonstration of right intent. Richard Holmes has argued that if concern about loss of
political capital is such that RoE are inadequate for mission success, then the
intervention (if elective) ought not to be embarked upon. 157
Right intent, and reasonable chance of success – including the availability and
willingness to commit all necessary resources – are, then, key elements in justifying
humanitarian intervention.
3.3.4.3 Proper Authority in Humanitarian Intervention
George Monbiot, writing in The Guardian 158 suggests that there are three principal
arguments commonly deployed against intervention. Firstly there is the argument that
* Issues of culpability, accountability and soldiers’ conduct in complex operations will be discussed in the
next chapter.
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