CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

humane values. The problem, of course, is that the scale of moral affront inherently is
utterly disconnected from probability of strategic effectiveness.’ (See also p9).
What Gray is reminding us is that Clausewitz is as applicable in interventions as in
traditional inter-state war: armed force must be subservient to political ends. If the ends
are not well-considered, or if the deployed means are inadequate or poorly matched to
achieving them, then failure is inevitable. In Somalia, already confused by parallel,
sometimes overlapping, sometimes competing, UN and US operations, ‘mission
objectives were unrealistic and unachievable’ says Paul Harris. 96 He quotes UN official
Elisabeth Lindenmayer describing the UN’s mission as ‘to put Humpty Dumpty
together again. In addition to protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, it was
asked to disarm the factions, assist in the establishment of a police force and a judicial
system, repatriate refugees and lead the country to national reconciliation.’ 97 Such an
admixture of roles is almost certainly incompatible, creates moral and legal confusion
for the soldiers who must try to put them into effect and inevitably results in rules of
engagement and a military stance that suits none of the roles ideally. Similar confusion
has existed in Bosnia, in Kosovo and today in Iraq. Furthermore, Mark Turner, writing
on Somalia for The Financial Times, warns that our political goals, even when they are
fully articulated, can be highly misjudged; the Western view of liberal democracy and
its essential institutions, evolved over centuries, may not fit easily when imposed
forcibly on countries with a very different experience: ‘Somalia has become a living
testament to the futility of political solutions driven by outsiders, where Western style
state institutions have little meaning and attempts by foreigners to introduce societal
change have faced constant failure.’ 98
So we have seen, in the West at least, a fundamental shift of ethic-set in the last decade
or two from one privileging order towards one focused on the right of the individual
over the right of the state; one that privileges individual justice over order and the
sovereignty of states. There has followed a signal change in the will to intervene. Yet
there are plenty of warnings on the dangers of unbridled intervention; the UN Charter
paradigm is too restrictive but we cannot countenance a free-for-all. What then should
guide the restrictions on states’ right, or indeed duty, to intervene?
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