CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

even driven, much more by the political, social, and strategic contexts than it is by
changes integral to military science.’ 10 The current dramatic change in the nature of
conflict is, argues Chris Donnelly 11 , the result of range of factors, principal among
which are the emergence of new threats to security, rapid and profound social change
(characterised by the globalisation of our economy), the narrow technical revolution in
military capabilities, and a shift in strategic focus from Central Europe to the so-called
‘Arc of Instability.’
NATO’s new Strategic Concept 12 – unveiled in 1999 to replace that articulated in 1991
as the Alliance’s initial response to the ending of the Cold War – identified a range of
‘new’ (or perhaps erstwhile suppressed) challenges to the West’s security. Whilst it
perceived ‘large scale conventional aggression against the Alliance’ 13 as unlikely –
though not inconceivable – it noted a ‘variety of military and non-military risks which
are multi-directional and often difficult to predict.’ 14 ‘Ethnic and religious rivalries,
territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and
the dissolution of states’ were all seen as elements that could result in ‘local or even
regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic
stability, to human suffering and to armed conflicts.’ 15 It further listed the
‘proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery,’ 16 noting in particular the
potential for their development and use by non-state actors, and on the global spread of
technology, in general, that could lead to ‘greater availability of sophisticated military
capabilities.’ 17 Finally, the Strategic Concept acknowledges the threat posed by wider
factors such as ‘terrorism, sabotage, and organised crime’ 18 , refugee flows and
disruption to essential resource supplies.
Three issues of relevance to this thesis fall readily out of NATO’s 1999 characterisation
of the new security environment. Firstly, the threat is no longer purely military in
nature and much of it results from the internal situation of states of concern; security is
no longer equivalent to defence. Thus it is insufficient to meet it with territorial-
oriented deterrent forces. Active involvement – indeed, even military intervention – in
the erstwhile sacrosanct affairs of other states may now be a necessary facet of our own
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