CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

too thinly spread and in living conditions partly dictated by ‘force protection’ concerns,
created conditions in which a significant immorality was committed.
Finally, it has been a repeated observation from both the US and UK experiences in Iraq
and Afghanistan that the nature of the attacks being faced and the political imperative
for casualty avoidance in an unpopular war (particularly the case in Iraq), has led to the
adoption of a force protection stance that impacts operational effectiveness, indeed is
often counter-productive, in counter-insurgency. In the words of one US commander:
‘Coalition forces are forced to interact with the Iraqi populace from a defensive posture,
effectively driving a wedge between the people and their protectors.’ 68
4.2.1.4 The Impact of Casualty/Risk/Cost Aversion: Premature Withdrawal
The remaining issue to be considered in relation to casualty/risk and/or cost aversion is
that of premature withdrawal. In such cases, experience suggests it is indeed casualty
aversion that is the primary factor; governments commit to interventions understanding
that they will be financially costly and there are no obvious examples of withdrawal
based primarily on increasing costs. However, there are clear examples of an
unanticipated body-count driving a change in policy. The longer-term impact of the so-
called ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident in Mogadishu in 1993 has been referred to above
(See p258). It is also a very stark example of the moral consequences of casualty/risk
aversion undermining political will to the extent that an intervention is terminated with
its mission incomplete. The incident had its genesis in the June 1993 attack on
Pakistani peacekeepers serving with UNOSOM II in which 26 were killed and a further
56 wounded. Supporters of the warlord ‘General’ Aideed were blamed and UNSCR
837 was passed authorising:
all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks…...
including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish
the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure
the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution,
trial and punishment. 69
In the operations that followed four American servicemen were killed and six injured,
leading to calls in Washington for the force to be withdrawn. However, the US
268