CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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ceding initiative to the enemy. Western strategy since the Second World War, then, whether in its response to the Cold War threat – Massive Retaliation – or in more recent wars of intervention, has tended to favour the third option. This has important implications for jus in bello. The relevant trends in the West’s preferred way of using force are, then, largely driven by risk and casualty (and perhaps cost) aversion. This has led to a reliance on technology – taking to the logical conclusion a strand of progress that has existed throughout the history of warfare: the development of weapons whose range (predominantly) allows you to engage your enemy before he is able to engage you. For, as JFC Fuller wrote as long ago as 1941, discerning it as a ‘constant tactical factor’: ‘Every improvement in weapon power, means of movement and protection has aimed at lessening terror and danger on one the side by increasing them on the other.’ 11 Today, this reliance on technology has brought with it a tendency to try to remove to the greatest extent possible our own soldiers from the battlefield. In doing so it also removes from the battlefield the moral agent; the arbiter of proper and improper conduct; the only agent for compassion and humanity. A further, unintended, consequence of the drive to ‘sanitise’ war, is that it may have made war more likely. If democracies are, as the Democratic Peace theory supposes, averse to war because of its cost, then as its costs reduce then they may be more inclined to use it as an instrument of policy. In other words the (all too often illusory) concept of ‘clean’ war, may make it an altogether more palatable policy option for Western politicians. For example, Michael Byers argues that: (A)fter decades of massive defence spending, the United States is assured of victory in any war it chooses to fight. High-tech weaponry has reduced the dangers to US personnel, making it easier to sell to domestic constituencies. As a result, some US politicians had begun – at least until the quagmire in Iraq – to view armed conflict as an attractive foreign policy option in times of domestic scandal or economic decline, rather than the high-risk recourse of last resort. This change in thinking has led to a more cavalier approach to the jus ad bellum, as exemplified by the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence, and is beginning to have a similar effect on the jus in bello. 12 251
Experience in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that however we might minimise our own casualties, use of force is seldom ‘clean’ for all sides and an issue we must consider is the extent to which our chosen methods transfer risk not only to the enemy (which in war, is fair enough) but to the innocent civilian population. A feature of modern professional armies in the West today is the clear articulation of an ethos that encapsulates a code of conduct, with roots in much older concepts, that may be termed ‘warriors’ honour’. Aspects of the sort of conflict being faced today may present that with some challenges. In the context of how the West wages war there is a rapidly developing trend towards ‘outsourcing’ swathes of military capability to the private sector, with a consequent growth in the number and role of PMCs. This is not free from moral consequence, in particular, it will be argued, in that it adds to the battlefield protagonists who may not be party to the warrior code, or share with professional soldiers the same imperative for jus in bello. 4.2.1 Risk/Casualty/Cost Aversion Minimising the costs associated with conflict – lives, treasure and political capital – is a natural and proper function for any government considering commitment of military forces. However, it is also important that the moral consequences of a decision not to invest any of these things, or to invest too little, is understood and included in the investment cost-benefit analysis. In particular a decision to commit to conflict must be accompanied by an understanding of the inevitability of casualties. Casualty-aversion has been identified as a characteristic of the Western approach to war particularly in the two decades since the end of the Cold War, though as a phenomenon especially associated with the US military it is often attributed to a political and military leadership shaped by the experience of Vietnam. This aversion is perhaps more fairly seen not as reluctance to accept the inevitability of casualties at all but rather as a reaction to what was seen as needless waste. Charles Dunlap, for example, suggests that ‘(s)ome of the impetus for casualty aversion arises from within the armed forces and originates in the military’s Vietnam legacy. Many in uniform believe that lives 252
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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER J
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ABSTRACT For nearly two millennia j
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CONTENTS Abstract ……………
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS Acronym Meanin
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which such political decisions are
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worst of all, continuall feare, and
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fact it does positive harm.’ 15 T
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whole with the interests of the fit
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war should be entered into without
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matter for realist determination, t
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and has returned to the fore of pol
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This is the context against which K
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equired to make war, and the people
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a clear perception of the new world
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which Keohane 59 defines as ‘pers
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underpinnings. As well as making th
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states) and could be predicted thro
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Hobbesianism/ Machiavellianism (Wig
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It recognises both that war and a s
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European Convention on Human Rights
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the other side of liberalism, possi
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the principal foci of this thesis.
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The clearest evidence for the stabi
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if we take Willard’s analogy, it
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promotion of common goals, there ca
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But shortly afterwards he continues
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premise by which Augustine came to
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understood only to apply between Ch
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Writing against the backdrop of a s
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have ‘plausible pretext.’ His w
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As Gross’s title suggests, this o
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organisations/arrangements acting u
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the realist must be persuaded that
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eserving to a supra-national body t
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70 K Waltz, Man, The State and War.
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153 Emerrich De Vattel, The Law of
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must again be found from first prin
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philosophically the ultimate expres
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Notwithstanding the significant ste
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nationalist regime. Had the Soviet
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The operation and extent of the vet
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59 over membership issues 38 . The
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(Of course, history was to show he
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Four years later, in early 2003, it
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2.2.3 Practical Failings Other fail
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nearly all important points. Not al
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equipped and trained forces were re
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Charter and apparently outwith its
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Navigation with Nicaragua. The Unit
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each Member undertakes to comply wi
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There is a second, related, point t
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2.2.4 Reordering the Value Set: New
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There was a growing recognition, th
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… … The global threat to our se
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levels of analysis will be used: th
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The dangers of unilateralism were a
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Still, there is no denying that the
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operation around Fallujah, a politi
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Figure 2-1: Hooded Iraqi Prisoner a
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international resolve; in 2003, sig
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into the First World War to “make
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As a side-issue, but closely relate
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… I suppose American power is mor
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Scholars have identified a number o
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The poor poll showing increased con
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167. 181 In the concurrent County a
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lack of clear justification for the
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Thinking of the position of individ
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Regiment of Fusiliers for abuse of
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The final issue to be considered fr
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during his premiership * . The issu
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war of defence and liberation, has
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Second World War with the predomina
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…the cooking of news before it wa
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In the case of US soldiers in Iraq,
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terms: ‘the ability to get people
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on the team who simply love the gam
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In common with many colleagues the
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Solomou, a medic with The London Ir
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- are accepted. In the case of rese
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57 Ibid, Article 47. 58 E Luard, op
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113 David D Newsome, ‘The Bush Pr
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162 G. John Ikenberry, ‘Why Expor
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212 C Dunlap, Organizational Change
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162
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problems of mobilization and inflex
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even driven, much more by the polit
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whose average weight has continuall
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One consequence of the blurring of
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minority and all parties have to be
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much wider than traditional defence
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3.3 Humanitarian Intervention 3.3.1
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Chapter 2 (see Section CHAPTER 22.2
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Further evidence of a shift of cons
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The inability of a strictly legal p
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and optimism that followed successf
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The non-cooperation of the Khmer Ro
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As with the operation in Cambodia,
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The community of nations decided to
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humane values. The problem, of cour
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the secessionist aims of a sustaina
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(T)here assuredly are cases in whic
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upholding the law is a good thing a
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Page 215 and 216: Of course, this conceptualization o
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Page 219 and 220: action. 143 For just one example of
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Page 233 and 234: Geoff Hoon argued that ‘… there
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Page 241 and 242: In the past decade, Saddam has syst
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Page 247 and 248: This chapter’s discussion of inte
Page 249 and 250: as with interventions, they will al
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Page 253 and 254: 137 K Roth, ‘War in Iraq not a Hu
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Page 257 and 258: warfare. AP I deals with ‘victims
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Page 287 and 288: This might be seen as the fulfilmen
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Page 293 and 294: Values form the very identity of th
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Page 297 and 298: of Independence, the Napoleonic Fre
Page 299 and 300: in Iraq throughout 2004-2005. Somet
Page 301 and 302: In July 2005 six former UK Chiefs o
Page 303 and 304: Nor does the expectation of being h
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Page 307 and 308: soldiers.’ 135 Although Gray goes
Page 309 and 310: had been done: soldiers were reluct
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4.4.1 PMCs A characteristic of cont
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Furthermore, the use of contract st
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We are left, then, with the inevita
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college at Chapultepec, for example
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of double effect is of dubious valu
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instrument of compassion is also re
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7 Ibid, p93. 8 Herfried Münkler (T
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69 UNSCR 837 (1993). Online at http
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137 Maj Gen A Stewart, Policy and t
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enter voluntarily. Until such a con
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If the application of the UN Charte
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5.6 Conclusion 6: Just War Offers a
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5.9 Conclusion 9: on ‘asymmetric
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328
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Higgins, Rosemary Hollis, Martin an
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Paperback edition 1994) de Wijk, Ro
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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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