CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

‘Osirak’ end of the scale) risks a significant increase in the occasions of use of armed
force. Byers argues that
(a) broad right of pre-emptive self-defence would also introduce uncertainties
into international relations. Who would decide that a potential threat justifies
pre-emptive action? How does one protect against opportunistic military
interventions justified under the guise of pre-emptive self-defence? Do we wish
to accord the same extended right to India, Pakistan or Israel……..? Could the
development of such a right prompt potential targets into striking first, using
rather than losing their biological, chemical and nuclear weapons? 205
From a just war perspective, the legitimacy of pre-emptive action must surely hinge on
last resort. However, judging when last resort has been reached is not easy; it is a
largely subjective judgement clearly influenced by relationship to the perceived threat.
Walzer’s case in support of Israel suggests that although actual attack by Egypt may not
have been imminent, her intent was to undermine Israel’s security and that, in any
meaningful sense, last resort had been reached in that there was no realistic possibility
of a diplomatic solution and no safe way for Israel to delay taking action. By contrast,
over Osirak, no such case of necessity could reasonably be made. Again, the 2003 Iraq
war demonstrates the dangers of over-stating a potential long-term threat as justification
for immediate action. Thomas Ricks 206 cites the New York Times as an example of just
this:
U.S. SAYS HUSSEIN INTENSIFIES QUEST FOR A BOMB PARTS, it
reported on page one of the edition of Sunday, September 8. “The closer
Saddam Hussein gets to a nuclear weapon, the harder he will be to deal with,” it
quoted a senior administration official as warning. It related that hardliners were
saying that the first irrefutable evidence “may be a mushroom cloud.”
The US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz also questioned traditional
understanding of imminence:
We cannot wait to act until the threat is imminent. The notion that we can wait
to prepare assumes that we will know when the threat is imminent. …
… … Just when were the attacks of September 11th imminent? Certainly they
were imminent on September 10th, although we didn’t know it. … …Anyone
who believes that we can wait until we have certain knowledge that attacks are
imminent, has failed to connect the dots that led to September 11th. 207
The issue was again confronted head-on by President Bush in a television interview in
February 2004: ‘I believe it is essential – that when we see a threat, we deal with those
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