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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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and security * ; and that the end of the Cold War was widely perceived as a new dawn for<br />

the UN’s effective primacy in that role. The next sections will examine the failures of<br />

the paradigm, some evident from the outset and, indeed, exacerbated by the Cold War,<br />

others only highlighted as the Cold War ended and the opportunity existed for the UN<br />

Charter to operate as intended.<br />

2.2.2 Structural Difficulties<br />

It was suggested in Chapter One (see p28) that Wight’s ‘three voices’ could all be heard<br />

in the structure of the United Nations: the liberal universalism of the revolutionists in<br />

the growing body of human rights legislation; rationalism in the institution itself, its<br />

embodiment of international law and the one nation-one vote formula of the General<br />

Assembly; but the loud voice of realism in the constitution of the Security Council. If,<br />

like the League of Nations before it, the United Nations owed its existence to the horror<br />

of global conflict, its founding fathers sought, nevertheless, to avoid the utopianism of<br />

the League. Thus it was forged not from the liberal idealism of a Woodrow Wilson, but<br />

from the hard-nosed diplomatic realism of Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt. Obvious<br />

from the outset was that only the Great Powers (the US, Soviet Union, the UK and, to a<br />

lesser extent, China) acting in cooperation the way they had in the war would have the<br />

resources to restore normalcy to a devastated world. Great responsibility would fall to<br />

them and special provision would therefore be necessary to protect their own vital<br />

interests. This was fundamental to the organizational structure they initially sketched<br />

out at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Anjali Patil explains the logic thus:<br />

The Major Powers assumed that whatever obligations were incorporated in the<br />

Charter, each member could hold on to the right to decide whether or not it<br />

would be a party to any projected action relating to the maintenance of peace<br />

and security. Each Major Power regarded the concurrence rule as safeguarding<br />

its own interests and assuring its collective dominance against any proposition<br />

that could be put forward to their disadvantage by any other Powers. 27<br />

* This is an important distinction. Whatever arguments may be made about its failure in this key role,<br />

there can be no disputing the important role the UN has played in facilitating global cooperation in many<br />

other fields – the International Postal Union is a good example of just one of its smaller, but very<br />

effective organs.<br />

73

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