CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long
term? In the past we talked too much of exit strategies. But having made a
commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay
with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large
numbers. And finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass
expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of
the world. But it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a
combustible part of Europe.
The first condition could be interpreted as a mixture of ‘just cause’ and
‘proportionality’; the second is clearly ‘last resort’; the third ‘reasonable chance of
success; the fourth ‘right intent’. Only the fifth condition, still an eminently sensible
one, and reflecting the earlier point about resources, is not in some way obviously
drawn from the just war tradition.
More recently still the attempt by Gareth Evans and the ICISS to codify the
circumstances under which humanitarian concern must override sovereignty also quite
clearly draws on just war tradition:
It is perhaps not as difficult as it appears at first sight to identify criteria for
military intervention for human protection purposes about which people should
be able to agree. It is true that there are presently almost as many different lists
of such criteria as there are contributions to the literature and political debate on
this subject. But the differing length of these lists, and the different terminology
involved, should not obscure the reality that there is an enormous amount of
common ground to be found when one focuses on the core issues.
While there is no universally accepted single list, in the Commission’s judgment
all the relevant decision making criteria can be succinctly summarized under the
following six headings: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort,
proportional means and reasonable prospects. 115 (Original emphasis).
The Commission spends considerable time discussing right authority and just cause
whilst the other four are taken with rather less discussion as reasonably uncontentious.
Other criteria for intervention have been advanced. In particular, it is worth considering
two alternative US formulations: the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, initially articulated
by US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984 and subsequently developed by
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell; and President Clinton’s
Presidential Decision Document (PDD) 25, produced in the wake of the Somalia
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