CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

Suarez takes this further, arguing that the only just cause for war must be ‘a grave
injustice which cannot be repaired or avenged in any other way.’ 144 This is what Ian
Holliday 145 in his re-conceptualisation of just cause terms ‘intractable injustice’ – a
replacement in the hierarchy of conditions for ‘just cause’ itself, which he raises to the
capstone position erstwhile occupied by jus ad bellum. (Holliday’s argument, which is
to some degree contrary to Vitoria’s and certainly less restrictive than Walzer’s
interpretation of Vitoria, will be considered further in Chapter 3). Suarez develops this
further, introducing the notion of proportionality (with respect to means): ‘it is not every
cause that is sufficient to justify war, but only those causes which are serious and
commensurate with the losses that the war would occasion.’ 146
Finally, it is also in this era, and largely attributed to Suarez, that the notion of
reasonable chance of success is introduced. Whilst there may be some moral worth in
an attacked state attempting to defend itself against the odds, an offensive war, whatever
its justification, is wrong if it does not have a reasonable chance of succeeding. 147
1.2.3 Secularization and Early International Law
The Christian Scholars discussed above were concerned with the reconciliation of
Christian conscience on the one hand, with obedience to secular authority, and the
maintenance of order, on the other. They were not attempting either to limit or, indeed,
establish the rights of states (such as these existed) to use force as an instrument of their
dealings with one another. As noted, Aquinas says little, explicitly, about what exactly
constitutes either ‘just cause’ or ‘right intent.’ The departure witnessed in the works of
scholars from the 17 th Century on is the merging of these theological concepts with
developing ideas of natural law and political philosophy – particularly emerging
concepts of statehood and sovereignty. This entailed a more detailed examination than
erstwhile of just cause and right intent, in particular. Among the many scholarly
founders of international law, it is perhaps Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) who stands most
prominent.
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