CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

tendency to equate jus ad bellum with Just Cause, of which the other jus ad bellum
tenets are then simply constituent parts or conditional clauses; we need a
reconceptualization of the doctrine that explicitly recognises this:
(W)e tend to think the conditions customarily placed alongside just cause in a
standard ad bellum list are actually components of it. A belligerent that engaged
in war against evil without exhausting the available options could not be said to
have a just cause. Another belligerent would not have just cause if it did not
meet the legitimate authority condition. Similarly there is no just cause in taking
excessive measures even to right an acknowledged wrong. The justice of a
given cause is, then, compromised and even undermined if conditions such as
right intention, legitimate authority and so on are not met. In short, a just cause
judgement can only be made at the end of this particular line, not at the
beginning. 131
Such a reconceptualization then requires a new condition to occupy the place of the
‘promoted’ just cause. Traditional notions of ‘self defence’ or ‘wrong received’ might
seem obvious, would have many supporters, and are to be found throughout the just war
canon. However, as all our earlier discussion on the will to intervene would suggest,
this is insufficient. Holliday draws in part on those same passages of Mill that we have
seen George Lucas turn to in his criticism of Walzer (see p195) (for example ‘War is an
ugly thing but not the ugliest of things: the decayed and degraded state of moral and
patriotic feeling which thinks nothing worth a war is worse’ 132 ). He then proposes that
the presumption against war, which stands at the very start of just war doctrine, should
be replaced with a presumption in favour of justice. The place of just cause in the
conditions of jus ad bellum may then be taken by ‘the existence of a demonstrable
injustice.’ Just cause may then be given a three part structure as shown in Figure 3-2.
Perceived Problem: intractable injustice
Demonstrable injustice
Last resort
Proposed solution: responsible intervention
Legitimate authority
Right intention
Risk assessment: weighing contingent factors
Reasonable chance of success
Proportionality (ends)
Figure 3-2 Holliday's Restructuring of Jus ad Bellum 133
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