CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

This chapter’s discussion of intervention considered the perceived inadequacies of the
current, legal-based paradigm for use of force. This paradigm establishes, in effect, that
only a response to state-on-state aggression is a just cause for war; its moral and legal
focus has been almost exclusively on the rights and personality of the state. The
paradigm has failed because of structural inadequacies – specifically the P5 veto in the
UN Security Council; because it lacks an enforcement mechanism; and because states
have demonstrated a lack of faith in the measures established for pacific measures of
dispute resolution.
Furthermore, the greater ability to intervene military as a result of the ending of the
Cold War inter-bloc tensions, has coincided with a hugely inflated desire to intervene as
the West’s (in particular) value-set has shifted away from protecting and promoting the
rights of states and in favour of valuing, primarily, the rights of individuals. A
paradigm that saw inter-state conflict as the major threat to peace and security, and
placed security prior to justice, has become outmoded. A tension has then emerged
between liberal objectives and the illiberal means necessary to achieve them. At the
same time the dangers of unfettered interventionism are recognised. The tentative
conclusion is that a framework is needed for justified intervention and the tenets of just
war doctrine – with some adaptation in understanding – can provide this. In particular
greater focus is needed on right intent, demonstrated through sound planning for and
full commitment to a better peace (what some are suggesting is, in fact, a third aspect to
just war, namely jus post-bellum). Also required is a broad understanding of proper
authority. Whilst it may not be practical to achieve this in a legal sense, it is represented
morally by broad-based, cross-cultural international approval, which circumstances may
require is turned to for post facto legitimisation.
The second significant challenge to our understanding of jus ad bellum comes from a
renewed argument in favour of anticipatory war – preventive or pre-emptive.
Preventive war is understood as one launched not in response to any specific aggression
– actual or reasonably perceived to have been set in train – but rather a supposed future
threat; it is aimed at a preventing actualisation of a potential enemy’s anticipated threat
capability in order to preserve a favourable (to the preventing power) status quo. By
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