CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

promotion of common goals, there cannot be any doubt that it has been in the past such
an institution, and remains one.’ But he goes on to explain that from the perspective of
international society there is a dual aspect to war:
On the one hand, war is a manifestation of disorder in international society,
bringing with it the threat of breakdown of international society itself into a state
of pure enmity of all against all. The society of states, accordingly, is concerned
to limit and contain war, to keep it within the bounds of rules laid down by
international society itself. On the other hand, war – as an instrument of state
policy and a basic determinant of the shape of the international system – is a
means which international society itself feels a need to exploit so as to achieve
its own purpose. 120
Thus, for international society, whilst war may be inevitable, even necessary, it must be
constrained by rules and conventions. Those Bull enumerates have a familiar ring to
any student of just war. Wight offers a similar perspective on war from the rationalist
voice within the tree traditions:
There are two basic tenets to the rationalist theory of war. The first is that the
object of war is peace, not vice versa. Peace is the norm, and war is the
violation or exception; peace is logically prior to war. … … The second tenet of
the Rationalist is that war is a necessary evil, to be minimized as far as possible.
It is necessary because it is the only means of justice when there is no political
superior. 121
This latter concept of war being justified because of the absence of a higher authority to
adjudicate and enforce peaceful resolution is very firmly in the just war tradition, made
quite explicit, as we shall see, by Aquinas (see p46) and developed into international
law by Grotius (see p49).
When we turn to the liberal tradition, where we can expect the predominant moral
reaction to be a cosmopolitan one, there should be no challenge in gaining an
acceptance that ethics plays a role in decisions to use force and in its subsequent
employment. Liberalism – in all its forms – is much more obviously admitting of
normative consideration. However, it encompasses both the extremes of pacifism and
the near- messianic export of its values, which is as likely to result in use of force as any
realpolitik. Thus at one extreme just war doctrine might be rejected as the appropriate
framework by liberals: those close to the pacifist position will positively condemn it for
too readily vindicating conflict. On the other hand, at the interventionist end of the
42