CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

international resolve; in 2003, significant contribution to the US effort was limited to
the UK and Australia.
The failure of the US to garner wider support for its coalition – particularly in
contributions of troops on the ground – created a significant military burden for both the
US and the UK, most especially in the post-conflict * phase. The extent of the
‘overstretch’ was highlighted in September 2003 – some 5 months after the cessation of
‘major combat operations’ when the US had approximately 150,000 troops deployed in
Iraq (but a total of over 180,000 when those in neighbouring countries and directly
associated with operation in Iraq are included), equating to roughly one third of its total
military manpower strength. The Congressional Budget Office at that time estimated
that the US Army would be ‘unable to sustain an occupation force of the present size
beyond about March 2004 if it chose not to keep individual units deployed to Iraq for
longer than one year without relief (an assumption consistent with DoD's current
planning).’ 135 It further assessed that beyond the winter of 2004-2005, only an
occupation force of no more that 38,000 to 64,000 could be sustained without
significant additional call-ups of reserves. The estimated cost associated with this level
of sustained commitments was $8 billion to $12 billion per annum. At the same time
the UK Foreign Office was, according to British newspaper reports, urging the
deployment of greater troop numbers to counter the growing insurgency. 136
Consequently, in what was widely seen as a climb-down by the Bush Administration,
the US was forced to seek a UN mandate for Iraq’s occupation and with it the
contribution of forces by a wider coalition. 137 US commentators, too, have argued that
the nature of the case made for the Iraq war both turned away potential contributors and
undermined the consensus behind the US’s wider strategy in its perceived ‘war against
global terror.’ E J Dionne Jr, writing in The Washington Post 138 argued that using
the tactics of a political campaign to sell the war in Iraq ….(had) turned off
potential allies abroad. …. A war supported by straightforward arguments and
based on a broad alliance, patiently constructed, could have united our nation
and much of the world on behalf of democratic ideals. Instead, … the consensus
brought into being by 9/11 has been shattered.
* That is post cessation of ‘major combat operations’; actual conflict in the form of significant insurgent
operations has continued unabated and caused significantly more casualties than the ‘combat’ phase.
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