CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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individual level is the view that absence of justification, or doubt about cause, is likely to be a frictional factor, and thus diminish fighting effectiveness. We are reminded, again, of the need to differentiate between what makes men fight, or fight well, in conflict from what motivates them to join the armed forces, either in peacetime or in response to actual or likely conflict. Thus moral justification is likely to have a different role for the long-term professional than the role it has for the short-term volunteer or conscript. Visiting Iraq in 2005 as Colonel of the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, Richard Holmes found a marked difference between the attitudes and opinions of the largely National Guard and Army Reserve US servicemen and the mainly regular British soldiers. (The impact on Britain’s reservists is discussed below). The US guardsmen regarded themselves as being ‘at war.’ Given the scale and the shock of the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep 2001 and the widespread acceptance in the US, despite the lack of any convincing evidence, of a link between the perpetrators and the Iraqi regime, this is not surprising. To many Americans the Iraq war was a clearly just response to unprovoked aggression that struck at the heart of America and her way of life. In the UK no such linkage took hold in the public imagination. Moreover, it was not until July 2005 that the UK suffered any direct attack from Al Qaeda, by which time any linkage with the Iraq war was more logically as cause (despite UK Government insistence to the contrary) rather than effect. UK soldiers tended, then, to take a more sanguine view of themselves as ‘on operations’ which implies routinely, and somewhat resignedly, fulfilling the policy of government. In the enduring operation that Iraq has become that is just as natural a response for a full-time professional as is the need for ideological motivation to bolster the morale of National Guardsmen whose lives have been turned upside down by a one-year compulsory call-out to face both the danger and the monotony of operations in Iraq. British Military Doctrine understands military effectiveness in terms of ‘fighting power, which is then understood to be composed of three components: Physical, Conceptual and Moral (see Figure 2-5). Although recognizing that such factors as ‘self-respect’ and ‘sense of purpose’ have a part to play, which we might relate to ethical issues, as presented here the Moral Component is rather narrowly defined in purely instrumental 143
terms: ‘the ability to get people to fight.’ The subsequent publication Soldiering, goes further in establishing a more existential understanding for the role of ethics: The British Army’s high morale and willingness to fight are based on an ethos which must transcend functional output. Some of the most barbarous and unprincipled military organisations in history have had tremendous morale and will to fight, based on excellent motivation, leadership and management, which have given them great military effectiveness and operational success. They have even possessed a greater external ethic to inspire them to conquest. However, consistent and sustainable national strategy, and true and enduring success on operations depend on moral strength – in war on moral dominance over an enemy - not just to overcome the adversary, but to establish the conditions for lasting peace. 251 The publication goes on to draw an explicit linkage to just war: ‘In battle, and all other military operations, high morale equates to the moral strength which gives true ascendancy over the enemy. The duty of bearing arms, of being prepared to fight, kill and if necessary die in carrying out orders, carries with it the responsibility only to do so in a just cause.’ 252 (Emphasis added) Figure 2-5 Military Effectiveness as Understood by British Military Doctrine 253 This need for a more deontological understanding of the ‘Moral component’ is explained by Major General Sebastian Roberts: ‘…military effectiveness cannot be 144
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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER J
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ABSTRACT For nearly two millennia j
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CONTENTS Abstract ……………
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS Acronym Meanin
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which such political decisions are
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worst of all, continuall feare, and
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fact it does positive harm.’ 15 T
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whole with the interests of the fit
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war should be entered into without
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matter for realist determination, t
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and has returned to the fore of pol
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This is the context against which K
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equired to make war, and the people
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a clear perception of the new world
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which Keohane 59 defines as ‘pers
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underpinnings. As well as making th
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states) and could be predicted thro
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Hobbesianism/ Machiavellianism (Wig
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It recognises both that war and a s
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European Convention on Human Rights
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the other side of liberalism, possi
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the principal foci of this thesis.
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The clearest evidence for the stabi
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if we take Willard’s analogy, it
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promotion of common goals, there ca
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But shortly afterwards he continues
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premise by which Augustine came to
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understood only to apply between Ch
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Writing against the backdrop of a s
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have ‘plausible pretext.’ His w
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As Gross’s title suggests, this o
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organisations/arrangements acting u
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the realist must be persuaded that
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eserving to a supra-national body t
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70 K Waltz, Man, The State and War.
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153 Emerrich De Vattel, The Law of
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must again be found from first prin
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philosophically the ultimate expres
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Notwithstanding the significant ste
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nationalist regime. Had the Soviet
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The operation and extent of the vet
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59 over membership issues 38 . The
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(Of course, history was to show he
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Four years later, in early 2003, it
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2.2.3 Practical Failings Other fail
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nearly all important points. Not al
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equipped and trained forces were re
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Charter and apparently outwith its
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Navigation with Nicaragua. The Unit
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Page 103 and 104: There is a second, related, point t
Page 105 and 106: 2.2.4 Reordering the Value Set: New
Page 107 and 108: There was a growing recognition, th
Page 109 and 110: … … The global threat to our se
Page 111 and 112: levels of analysis will be used: th
Page 113 and 114: The dangers of unilateralism were a
Page 115 and 116: Still, there is no denying that the
Page 117 and 118: operation around Fallujah, a politi
Page 119 and 120: Figure 2-1: Hooded Iraqi Prisoner a
Page 121 and 122: international resolve; in 2003, sig
Page 123 and 124: into the First World War to “make
Page 125 and 126: As a side-issue, but closely relate
Page 127 and 128: … I suppose American power is mor
Page 129 and 130: Scholars have identified a number o
Page 131 and 132: The poor poll showing increased con
Page 133 and 134: 167. 181 In the concurrent County a
Page 135 and 136: lack of clear justification for the
Page 137 and 138: Thinking of the position of individ
Page 139 and 140: Regiment of Fusiliers for abuse of
Page 141 and 142: The final issue to be considered fr
Page 143 and 144: during his premiership * . The issu
Page 145 and 146: war of defence and liberation, has
Page 147 and 148: Second World War with the predomina
Page 149 and 150: …the cooking of news before it wa
Page 151: In the case of US soldiers in Iraq,
Page 155 and 156: on the team who simply love the gam
Page 157 and 158: In common with many colleagues the
Page 159 and 160: Solomou, a medic with The London Ir
Page 161 and 162: - are accepted. In the case of rese
Page 163 and 164: 57 Ibid, Article 47. 58 E Luard, op
Page 165 and 166: 113 David D Newsome, ‘The Bush Pr
Page 167 and 168: 162 G. John Ikenberry, ‘Why Expor
Page 169 and 170: 212 C Dunlap, Organizational Change
Page 171 and 172: 162
Page 173 and 174: problems of mobilization and inflex
Page 175 and 176: even driven, much more by the polit
Page 177 and 178: whose average weight has continuall
Page 179 and 180: One consequence of the blurring of
Page 181 and 182: minority and all parties have to be
Page 183 and 184: much wider than traditional defence
Page 185 and 186: 3.3 Humanitarian Intervention 3.3.1
Page 187 and 188: Chapter 2 (see Section CHAPTER 22.2
Page 189 and 190: Further evidence of a shift of cons
Page 191 and 192: The inability of a strictly legal p
Page 193 and 194: and optimism that followed successf
Page 195 and 196: The non-cooperation of the Khmer Ro
Page 197 and 198: As with the operation in Cambodia,
Page 199 and 200: The community of nations decided to
Page 201 and 202: humane values. The problem, of cour
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the secessionist aims of a sustaina
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(T)here assuredly are cases in whic
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upholding the law is a good thing a
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debacle. Weinberger-Powell is, esse
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‘Democracy’ says de Wijk ‘is
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(m)ost internal political or civil
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Of course, this conceptualization o
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HRW concluded that ‘the killing i
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action. 143 For just one example of
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political will is robustness in Rul
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motivated, to lack cultural empathy
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(which is essentially non-intervent
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armed force when necessary, to prev
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‘intractable injustice’? Yes ar
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immediate objective is the destruct
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Geoff Hoon argued that ‘… there
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action before any blow is actually
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international opinio juris recognis
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unproven case that preventive actio
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In the past decade, Saddam has syst
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‘Osirak’ end of the scale) risk
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The UN formally considered the case
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This chapter’s discussion of inte
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as with interventions, they will al
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60 Independent International Commis
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137 K Roth, ‘War in Iraq not a Hu
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http://www.publications.parliament.
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warfare. AP I deals with ‘victims
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Münkler 8 suggests that the Democr
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Experience in Kosovo, Iraq and Afgh
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The issue might, then, be seen as o
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eplacements, even in the United Sta
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intervene and was certainly, in par
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willing to provide equipment suppor
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applying selectivity to interventio
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it’s a political decision in Wash
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unconvinced. Danielle Pletka, of th
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too thinly spread and in living con
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watching as lightly armed drunken t
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had been over Bosnia not so much to
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….. strategies calling for use of
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technology to achieve the long-soug
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This might be seen as the fulfilmen
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the rules of war, beginning with th
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Army, 99 with its accompanying Comm
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Values form the very identity of th
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three are intertwined and inter-rel
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of Independence, the Napoleonic Fre
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in Iraq throughout 2004-2005. Somet
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In July 2005 six former UK Chiefs o
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Nor does the expectation of being h
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never succeeds is, unfortunately, a
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soldiers.’ 135 Although Gray goes
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had been done: soldiers were reluct
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4.4.1 PMCs A characteristic of cont
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Furthermore, the use of contract st
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We are left, then, with the inevita
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college at Chapultepec, for example
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of double effect is of dubious valu
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instrument of compassion is also re
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7 Ibid, p93. 8 Herfried Münkler (T
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69 UNSCR 837 (1993). Online at http
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137 Maj Gen A Stewart, Policy and t
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enter voluntarily. Until such a con
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If the application of the UN Charte
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5.6 Conclusion 6: Just War Offers a
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5.9 Conclusion 9: on ‘asymmetric
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328
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Higgins, Rosemary Hollis, Martin an
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Paperback edition 1994) de Wijk, Ro
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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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