CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

school, just war may provide just the restraint that is needed in order to avoid the
dangers of hubris or moral crusade, both of which can all too readily spring from the
liberal tradition. The framework for debate provided by the doctrine of just war can be
a useful tool for those who seek to provide a moral basis for the use of force in
spreading the liberal agenda. Without such a framework there is a danger that, in
Ignatieff’s words, ‘policy and public opinion are both likely to lurch continuously
between the Scylla of hubristic overcommitment and the Charybdis of cynical
disengagement.’ 122 In the same way that the conventions of jus in bello and jus ad
bellum can be seen as amongst the shared values required for the existence of
international society, so too can it be argued that they count among the institutions of
the neo-liberals.
The next Chapter will examine in greater depth the importance for having a solid
justification for the use of force. First, though, we will trace the origins and
development of just war doctrine and make the case that issues of jus ad bellum, having
been rendered obsolescent by the middle of the 20th Century, have made a comeback
with the apparent collapse of the legal paradigm that usurped them.
1.2 Historical Context: The Origins and Development of Just War Doctrine
Thucydides notwithstanding, it is quite clear that as far back as the ancient world there
was moral debate and moral impact both on decisions to make war and conduct therein.
Aristotle was amongst the earliest writers known to have argued for some
circumscription of the use of force in the relationship between states. It is not
something upon which he dwells long, indeed it is little more than a passing mention.
However, he is quite clear that the only purpose of war is to obtain peace and he
presents this in such a manner as to suggest that for him it is almost a truism. Indeed, it
is offered more by way of an example of the difference between rational ends and
means, those things which are good in themselves and those which are merely useful or
necessary: ‘War must be looked upon simply as a means to peace, action as a means to
leisure, acts merely useful as a means to those which are good in themselves.’ 123 Not
that this in itself limits recourse to war; it merely says that war is not, of itself, good.
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