CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

eplacements, even in the United States, is very small indeed. Thus, in both manpower
and materiel terms, the force must be protected. The situation is analogous to the
nineteenth/early-twentieth maritime doctrine of the ‘fleet in being’ that dictated
avoidance of decisive engagement if at all possible. This resonates, too, with Münkler’s
argument that contemporary conflict has similarities with pre-Westphalian wars when
the value of the feudal army militated against its exposure to direct engagement with the
enemy and therefore rendered preferable attacks upon the civilian populace, crops and
land.
So, even if a good case can be made that casualty aversion is in inverse proportion to
national interest, it is still, understandably, an influence on policy and especially so in
those conflicts deemed ‘discretionary’. Nor is this solely a US phenomena; it has
played a key role in the decisions of several NATO members as to whether they will
commit troops to conflicts and, having done so, what roles their troops may undertake.
A clear example is afforded by NATO’s operation in Afghanistan where, in 2007,
insufficient troops could be found to meet the requirement of operations in the
dangerous Southern Region; even those NATO nations who were contributing to the
mission, refused to allow their redeployment to support the UK/Canadian (and to a very
small extent Dutch) forces operating in Kandahar and Helmand. 31
What, then, is the potential impact on jus in bello? Firstly, it affects willingness to
intervene at all or restricts intervention to non-military and often non-decisive means.
Secondly it enhances a perception of selective intervention that in turn undermines
claims to moral universality. Thirdly it can lead to conduct of operations that transfers
risk to the population at large – often those whose ‘rescue’ is providing the jus ad
bellum for the intervention in the first place. Fourthly, it can result in an inadequate
commitment of manpower that in turn impacts on the conduct of operations. Finally, it
can lead to premature withdrawal from an intervention which may leave the situation
worse than had no intervention occurred. Evidence of all of these can be found in
Western interventions since the end of the Cold War.
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