CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members……. 56 Planning and direction for the use of these forces was to be the responsibility of the Security Council, aided by the Military Staff Committee, provided for in Article 47: 1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. 2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work. 3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently. 4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees. 57 Had these two elements come to fruition then the Security Council would have had the ‘teeth which the League had so conspicuously lacked and which the UN, it was believed, would require if it were to be an effective agent for peace enforcement.’ 58 The importance attached to the issue might be gauged from the fact that it is the subject of the Security Council’s very first Resolution 59 , which requested that the Permanent Members direct their Chiefs of Staff, or their representatives, to meet in London in February 1946 as the Military Staff Committee and there ‘draw up proposals for its organization.’ 60 This it did, subsequently meeting from March onwards in New York. It was immediately apparent, however, that the degree of consensus evident at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco on the principle of providing forces to the UN, would not translate into agreement about the mechanics of that provision or the size and shape of the force. Whilst there was agreement on certain basic issues, that the contingents would remain part of their own national forces, for example, rather than constituting a fully international and directly recruited force, differences emerged on 83
nearly all important points. Not all disagreements split along East-West lines but the most important ones did. The Western Powers envisioned UN bases worldwide at which the contingents could be based. The Soviet Union vigorously opposed this. Western proposals to assist other states in the equipping and supplying of their contributions were similarly opposed by the Soviet Union as an attempt to secure further Western domination. Most importantly, no agreement could be reached on the size of the force or the breakdown of contribution from each of the Permanent Members. At the top end of the scale, the US proposed a force of twenty divisions, almost 4000 aircraft and over 100 major ships! The Soviet Union perceived the UN as essentially Western dominated (as indeed its major organs remained until the substantial increase in Third World independent membership post-decolonisation, and the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement). Consequently it would only support a much smaller force and one in which each element, land, sea and air, was constituted in equal proportion by each of the Permanent Members. Negotiations in the Military Staff Committee and subsequent debate in the Security Council failed to reach agreement. So the provisions of Article 43 have never been met. 61 The Military Staff Committee has remained in existence, meeting regularly in New York at the level of the Permanent Five’s Defence/Military Attachés to the US. However, these meetings have rarely been more than a formality, opening and closing with no business on their agendas. The notable exception to this was during the 1991 Gulf War when the Committee initially played an informal coordinating role and then, in accordance with Resolution 665 62 , a more formal one. Recognising, in 1992, ‘that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter’ 63 Secretary General Boutros-Ghali called upon the Security Council to reinitiate negations on the ‘special agreements’ envisioned by Article 43: Under the political circumstances that now exist for the first time since the Charter was adopted, the long-standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail. The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response. 64 84
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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER J
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ABSTRACT For nearly two millennia j
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CONTENTS Abstract ……………
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS Acronym Meanin
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which such political decisions are
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worst of all, continuall feare, and
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fact it does positive harm.’ 15 T
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whole with the interests of the fit
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war should be entered into without
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matter for realist determination, t
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and has returned to the fore of pol
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This is the context against which K
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equired to make war, and the people
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a clear perception of the new world
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which Keohane 59 defines as ‘pers
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underpinnings. As well as making th
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states) and could be predicted thro
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Hobbesianism/ Machiavellianism (Wig
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It recognises both that war and a s
Page 41 and 42: European Convention on Human Rights
Page 43 and 44: the other side of liberalism, possi
Page 45 and 46: the principal foci of this thesis.
Page 47 and 48: The clearest evidence for the stabi
Page 49 and 50: if we take Willard’s analogy, it
Page 51 and 52: promotion of common goals, there ca
Page 53 and 54: But shortly afterwards he continues
Page 55 and 56: premise by which Augustine came to
Page 57 and 58: understood only to apply between Ch
Page 59 and 60: Writing against the backdrop of a s
Page 61 and 62: have ‘plausible pretext.’ His w
Page 63 and 64: As Gross’s title suggests, this o
Page 65 and 66: organisations/arrangements acting u
Page 67 and 68: the realist must be persuaded that
Page 69 and 70: eserving to a supra-national body t
Page 71 and 72: 70 K Waltz, Man, The State and War.
Page 73 and 74: 153 Emerrich De Vattel, The Law of
Page 75 and 76: must again be found from first prin
Page 77 and 78: philosophically the ultimate expres
Page 79 and 80: Notwithstanding the significant ste
Page 81 and 82: nationalist regime. Had the Soviet
Page 83 and 84: The operation and extent of the vet
Page 85 and 86: 59 over membership issues 38 . The
Page 87 and 88: (Of course, history was to show he
Page 89 and 90: Four years later, in early 2003, it
Page 91: 2.2.3 Practical Failings Other fail
Page 95 and 96: equipped and trained forces were re
Page 97 and 98: Charter and apparently outwith its
Page 99 and 100: Navigation with Nicaragua. The Unit
Page 101 and 102: each Member undertakes to comply wi
Page 103 and 104: There is a second, related, point t
Page 105 and 106: 2.2.4 Reordering the Value Set: New
Page 107 and 108: There was a growing recognition, th
Page 109 and 110: … … The global threat to our se
Page 111 and 112: levels of analysis will be used: th
Page 113 and 114: The dangers of unilateralism were a
Page 115 and 116: Still, there is no denying that the
Page 117 and 118: operation around Fallujah, a politi
Page 119 and 120: Figure 2-1: Hooded Iraqi Prisoner a
Page 121 and 122: international resolve; in 2003, sig
Page 123 and 124: into the First World War to “make
Page 125 and 126: As a side-issue, but closely relate
Page 127 and 128: … I suppose American power is mor
Page 129 and 130: Scholars have identified a number o
Page 131 and 132: The poor poll showing increased con
Page 133 and 134: 167. 181 In the concurrent County a
Page 135 and 136: lack of clear justification for the
Page 137 and 138: Thinking of the position of individ
Page 139 and 140: Regiment of Fusiliers for abuse of
Page 141 and 142: The final issue to be considered fr
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during his premiership * . The issu
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war of defence and liberation, has
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Second World War with the predomina
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…the cooking of news before it wa
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In the case of US soldiers in Iraq,
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terms: ‘the ability to get people
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on the team who simply love the gam
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In common with many colleagues the
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Solomou, a medic with The London Ir
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- are accepted. In the case of rese
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57 Ibid, Article 47. 58 E Luard, op
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113 David D Newsome, ‘The Bush Pr
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162 G. John Ikenberry, ‘Why Expor
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212 C Dunlap, Organizational Change
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162
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problems of mobilization and inflex
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even driven, much more by the polit
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whose average weight has continuall
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One consequence of the blurring of
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minority and all parties have to be
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much wider than traditional defence
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3.3 Humanitarian Intervention 3.3.1
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Chapter 2 (see Section CHAPTER 22.2
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Further evidence of a shift of cons
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The inability of a strictly legal p
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and optimism that followed successf
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The non-cooperation of the Khmer Ro
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As with the operation in Cambodia,
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The community of nations decided to
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humane values. The problem, of cour
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the secessionist aims of a sustaina
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(T)here assuredly are cases in whic
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upholding the law is a good thing a
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debacle. Weinberger-Powell is, esse
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‘Democracy’ says de Wijk ‘is
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(m)ost internal political or civil
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Of course, this conceptualization o
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HRW concluded that ‘the killing i
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action. 143 For just one example of
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political will is robustness in Rul
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motivated, to lack cultural empathy
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(which is essentially non-intervent
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armed force when necessary, to prev
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‘intractable injustice’? Yes ar
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immediate objective is the destruct
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Geoff Hoon argued that ‘… there
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action before any blow is actually
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international opinio juris recognis
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unproven case that preventive actio
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In the past decade, Saddam has syst
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‘Osirak’ end of the scale) risk
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The UN formally considered the case
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This chapter’s discussion of inte
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as with interventions, they will al
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60 Independent International Commis
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137 K Roth, ‘War in Iraq not a Hu
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http://www.publications.parliament.
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warfare. AP I deals with ‘victims
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Münkler 8 suggests that the Democr
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Experience in Kosovo, Iraq and Afgh
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The issue might, then, be seen as o
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eplacements, even in the United Sta
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intervene and was certainly, in par
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willing to provide equipment suppor
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applying selectivity to interventio
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it’s a political decision in Wash
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unconvinced. Danielle Pletka, of th
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too thinly spread and in living con
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watching as lightly armed drunken t
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had been over Bosnia not so much to
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….. strategies calling for use of
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technology to achieve the long-soug
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This might be seen as the fulfilmen
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the rules of war, beginning with th
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Army, 99 with its accompanying Comm
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Values form the very identity of th
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three are intertwined and inter-rel
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of Independence, the Napoleonic Fre
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in Iraq throughout 2004-2005. Somet
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In July 2005 six former UK Chiefs o
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Nor does the expectation of being h
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never succeeds is, unfortunately, a
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soldiers.’ 135 Although Gray goes
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had been done: soldiers were reluct
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4.4.1 PMCs A characteristic of cont
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Furthermore, the use of contract st
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We are left, then, with the inevita
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college at Chapultepec, for example
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of double effect is of dubious valu
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instrument of compassion is also re
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7 Ibid, p93. 8 Herfried Münkler (T
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69 UNSCR 837 (1993). Online at http
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137 Maj Gen A Stewart, Policy and t
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enter voluntarily. Until such a con
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If the application of the UN Charte
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5.6 Conclusion 6: Just War Offers a
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5.9 Conclusion 9: on ‘asymmetric
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328
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Higgins, Rosemary Hollis, Martin an
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Paperback edition 1994) de Wijk, Ro
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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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