CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

Just Cause: force may be used only to correct a grave, public evil, i.e.
aggression or massive violation of the basic rights of whole populations;
Legitimate Authority: only duly constituted public authorities may use
deadly force or wage war;
Right Intention: force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely
for that purpose;
Probability of Success: arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a
case where disproportionate measures are required to achieve success;
Proportionality: the overall destruction expected from the use of force
must be outweighed by the good to be achieved;
Last Resort: force may be used only after all peaceful alternatives have
been seriously tried and exhausted.
These criteria (jus ad bellum), taken as a whole, must be satisfied in order to
override the strong presumption against the use of force. 109 (Original emphasis).
For Paul Ramsey, too, the use of military force in the pursuit of justice is among the
‘rights and duties of states unless and until supplanted by superior government’ 110 This
echoes Aquinas’ argument that war between states could be justified in a way that war
between private citizens could not because states had no higher authority to turn to for
adjudication and application of law (see p46). It also anticipates the ICISS report (see
p182) in seeing intervention, in certain circumstances, as not only permissible but
obligatory. Ramsey identifies four conditions that determine the circumstances in
which intervention should be considered: the political justice to be gained; order, which
is itself an end to be served; the degree to which international and national good are to
be served, recognizing that these two may be competing, but seeking circumstances in
which there is the greatest overlap; and the requirements of both national and
international law. 111 He is explicit in arguing that there are circumstances in which the
interests of justice require that the law be overridden:
Not all justice is legal justice. Not all order is legal order. The legalities
comprise, of course, mankind’s attempt to impose some coherence upon the
order of power. But such coherence flows from the justice that may be
preserved, beyond or beneath the legalities, in the relative power positions of the
nations. 112
Recognising the greater imperfections of international law compared with domestic law
(itself imperfect), and especially the even greater lack of processes for change, Ramsey
is clearly of the view that arguments of justice can override those of law; nevertheless,
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