CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

the term is used here, and in reluctant acceptance that however inaccurate it might be
the term has fallen into use not just in common parlance but in the relevant specialist
literature too 106 .
Is there, then, a need to consider the moral dimension of asymmetrical warfare at all; are
there aspects of it that require that its moral dimension be studied separately from that
of warfare as a whole? Clausewitz would urge consideration of warfare as an entirety
and more recently Colin Gray has cautioned similarly. 107 Certainly those who plan at
the strategic and operational level would do well to heed this advice and press it on
politicians too: asymmetric warfare is first and foremost warfare. This is not a semantic
point; it matters because it is necessary to understand that in asymmetric warfare, as in
any other kind, it is a political objective that is sought (by both sides); armed force is
used as an instrument towards that political end. In asymmetric warfare, as understood
here, the West’s enemies seek to use force – and other means – asymmetrically; but still
to achieve a political end. Understanding this is important because it must shape the
response. In considering the response to asymmetric challenges it is the moral
dimension that most needs attention for, as Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster says, when
confronting these challenges ‘… the moral and conceptual components of capability …
are likely to prove the most contentious and present … the greatest challenges. …
Changing structures and platform capabilities is one thing: changing the way your
people think, interact and behave under extreme duress is much more difficult.’ 108
To recap the three principal characteristics in ‘new wars’ identified by Herfried
Münkler 109 (see p169) are de-statization, that is the proliferation and increasing
importance of non-state-actors; the attempt to focus violence on the weak and
vulnerable, as a matter of deliberate policy, rather than against the enemy’s military
forces; and thirdly the ‘automization of forms of violence that used to be part of a single
military system.’ 110 That is the use of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, once tactical
options, as strategic ends in their own right. Each of these, singly and in combination,
leads to asymmetries of direct relevance: between state and non-state actors; between
regular and irregular forces; and between the law-abiding and the non-law-abiding. The
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