CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

have ‘plausible pretext.’ His work is notable for his anticipation of many of the
questions that concern us today. He is explicit, for example, about the right to wage war
on behalf of a third party – provided that party’s cause is just, and the party coming to
its aid has ‘reasonable ground’ for conducting hostilities. And he deals with the
complex issue of a state’s responsibility for the actions of those who have taken refuge
on its territory and proceed to use it as a base to attack other states:
And in fact rulers of states do share in wrongs committed by their long settled
citizens or by those who have recently taken refuge with them, if the rulers
allowed the commission of wrongs or provide refuge. For such allowance to be
culpable there must be a knowledge of the crime and ability to prevent it. Rulers
are presumed to be aware of the open and habitual actions of their citizens, and
there is always a presumption of their ability to prevent them unless there is
evidence of its absence. However, the right to make war upon a ruler who
accepts and protects a delinquent, who is seeking refuge with him solely to
escape punishment, arises more from particular agreements between neighbours
and allies than from any common obligation. This is not the case, however, if
the refugee while with us is planning hostilities against the state he has left. 152
The secularisation of just war was effectively concluded by the work of Emmerich de
Vattel (1714-67) who moved it beyond the realm of natural law and morality and into
that of what he terms ‘voluntary law’. For, whilst Vattel accepts natural law as the basis
for the rights of nations, he concludes that it is of no help in adjudicating disputes
between them:
The doctrines laid down in the preceding chapter are a logical inference from
sound principles, from the eternal rules of justice; they are the provisions of that
sacred law which Nature, or the Divine Author of Nature, has imposed upon
Nations. … … But how shall this law be made to prevail in the quarrels of the
Nations and sovereigns who live together in the state of nature? They recognize
no superior who shall decide between them and define the rights and obligations
of each…..
Let us, therefore, leave to the conscience of sovereigns the observance of the
natural and necessary law in all its strictness; and indeed it is never lawful for
them to depart from it. But as regards the external operation of that law in
human society, we must necessarily have recourse to certain rules of more
certain and easy application, and this in the interest of the safety and welfare of
the great society of the human race. These rules are those of the voluntary Law
of Nations. 153
So natural law should be the guiding force for individual conduct including, indeed
especially, that of sovereigns. Moreover, it is natural law that demands that nations see
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