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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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The operation and extent of the veto was, inevitably, a major cause of division at the<br />

1945 San Francisco Conference that paved the way for the signing of the UN Charter;<br />

not only between the Major Powers (by then extended to include France) and the rest,<br />

but also between the big five themselves. Urged by President Truman to bring the<br />

Conference to a speedy conclusion, his Secretary of State, Edward R Stettinius Jr,<br />

argued that ‘it would be unwise to press too strenuously because of resentment which<br />

might be created with the other countries which might jeopardize the final outcome of<br />

our great undertaking.’ 28 Among the issues still dividing the five powers was<br />

specifying ‘the parts of the charter on which the voting will not require unanimity on the<br />

part of the five great powers.’ 29 A critical issue was the degree to which the veto might<br />

be used to prevent not only Security Council action on an issue but even its discussion<br />

of an issue. Stettinius sent a further memo to the President the following day:<br />

We have reached a very serious crisis in the Conference in San Francisco.<br />

Gromyko told the meeting of Heads of five principal delegations last night that<br />

the Soviet Government would not agree to permit even QUOTE consideration<br />

and discussion UNQUOTE of any dispute or threatening situation brought<br />

before the proposed security council unless formal decision by seven members<br />

of the council including the unanimous vote of the five permanent members was<br />

taken. … … We have maintained however that … (n)o individual member of<br />

the council should be in a position to stop the consideration and discussion of a<br />

dispute brought before the council. 30<br />

Stettinius was able to announce the Soviet Union’s eventual agreement to the position<br />

of the other four Major Powers on 8 June 31 and the conference was able to conclude its<br />

work.<br />

Whilst this is evidence that the Powers other than Russia were keen to see some<br />

tempering of their veto power, the importance that all five attached to it, and that they<br />

had had to argue that position strenuously with the other nations is clear from the<br />

transcripts of their representatives’ closing statements. The Chinese said that<br />

Starting from the premise that everyone desired to make the Security Council a<br />

strong and effective organ, there was no choice but to support the rule of<br />

unanimity as essential for its strength and effectiveness. The alternative was a<br />

voting system which, though it might be more perfect, could in any given<br />

moment, weaken the Council in its efforts to act promptly and effectively. 32<br />

74

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