CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

three months. Moreover, members were to refrain from going to war with a state
accepting the decision of the arbitration or judicial review, or Council report.
This represented but a first step in a process aimed at prohibiting war, which was
effectively concluded by The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed on 27
August 1928 – the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris. Article 1 of the
Treaty condemns ‘recourse to war for the solution of international controversies’ and
renounces states’ use of it ‘as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another.’ However, it retains the right of states to go to war in self-defence or against
the violator of a treaty and also places no restriction on the League collectively taking
enforcement action. Important step though this was, it referred only to war, with the
result that many states have simply insisted that the conflicts in which they have been
engaged have not amounted to war. Moreover, it established mechanisms neither for
pacific dispute settlement nor for enforcement of the renunciation of war.
The UN Charter seeks to address these issues. Article 2(4) states: ‘All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’ Thus in its choice of language it
moves away from ‘war’ in favour of ‘use of force’. Whether this terminology implies a
prohibition also on uses of force other than armed force has been a subject of debate.
Shaw 158 points out that although Article 2(4) – the classic statement of the prohibition
on use of force – is unqualified, nevertheless both the preamble to the Charter and
Article 51 (on the right to self-defence) refer specifically to ‘armed force’. Although
this is not, he concedes, conclusive evidence that Article 2(4) is intended only to
prohibit armed force, it is strongly indicative. Likewise, although it has been argued
that the prohibition is only on use of force aimed at ‘territorial integrity’ or ‘political
independence,’ Article 2(4) is generally construed as a universal embargo on the use of
force. For, as Skubiszewski argues 159 it must be seen in the light both of the preamble:
‘ensure ….. that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’ and the
obligation in Article 2(3) always to seek peaceful dispute settlement. The only
exceptions are use of force by the UN itself (Articles 24, 39-50, 106), by regional
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