CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

The community of nations decided to respond to the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina with an arms embargo, with humanitarian aid and with the
deployment of a peacekeeping force. It must be clearly stated that these
measures were poor substitutes for more decisive and forceful action to prevent
the unfolding horror.
The ‘cardinal lesson’ concludes Annan, ‘is that a deliberate and systematic attempt to
terrorize, expel or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary
means, and with the political will to carry through the policy to its logical conclusion’ 90
The final point is key, for in the latter stages of the Srebrenica debacle it was not that
there was no mandate, nor that there was a lack of sufficient force available; rather it
was an absence of political will to recognize that a change of approach was necessary
and then to carry through explicitly articulated threats. Breakthrough in Bosnia was not
achieved until the mindset on the UN had changed. Avoiding the mistakes so tragically
evident at Srebrenica, Annan argued, would require that states recognize the need to
address:
(s)uch issues as the gulf between mandate and means; the inadequacy of
symbolic deterrence in the face of a systematic campaign of violence; the
pervasive ambivalence within the United Nations regarding the role of force in
the pursuit of peace; an institutional ideology of impartiality even when
confronted with genocide; and a range of doctrinal and institutional issues that
go to the heart of the United Nations’ ability to keep the peace and help protect
civilian populations from armed conflict. 91
If further examples of the failings in traditional peacekeeping were required, they could
easily be drawn from the UN experience in Somalia (UNOSOM * I, Apr 92-Mar 93,
UNOSOM II, Mar 93-Mar 95), Rwanda (UNAMIR † Oct 93-Mar 96), or from Sudan
where the tragedy is still playing out. Lest it be thought that what has been said above
is an attack on the UN, specifically, it should also be noted that Somalia offers a
dramatic example of what can go wrong in unilateral intervention operations, too. The
US intervention in Somalia, Operation RESTORE HOPE, has been aptly described as
‘not a peacekeeping mission. It was rather one of armed humanitarianism.’ 92 It ended in
disaster and tragedy.
* United Nations Operation in Somalia.
† United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda.
190