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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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However, at its worst this frustration, fuelled by outrage and understandable moral<br />

indignation, and possibly sometimes by a sense of moral and cultural superiority, can<br />

translate into full-scale atrocity as at My Lai.<br />

The My Lai Massacre serves also as an extreme example of what can be interpreted as a<br />

gross misconception of ‘enemy non-combatants’. That is to say the tendency<br />

automatically to identify with the enemy all those of the same nationality/ethnicity as<br />

him. When regulars cannot then strike the enemy directly, they may be tempted to<br />

attack him through the proxy of these ‘enemy non-combatants’ – in a mirror image of<br />

the asymmetric fighter’s attacks on the civilian population. The term is in itself a<br />

dangerous one. It makes some sense in symmetric inter-state war and, indeed, allows us<br />

to avail ourselves of the doctrine of double-effect. But the term surely has little<br />

meaning if any in asymmetric warfare and most especially not in conflicts of<br />

humanitarian intervention/rescue in which the civilian population are not ‘enemy non-<br />

combatants’ – to whom foreseeable but unintended consequences are acceptable<br />

proportionate to military necessity – but the ‘victims’ whose rescue is central to the jus<br />

ad bellum of the conflict.<br />

Given this range of additional moral challenges when engaged in asymmetric conflict, it<br />

is necessary to consider the specific, and topical, issue of soldiers’ accountability and<br />

culpability in these circumstances. The issue arises because of the additional challenges<br />

outlined, and because these soldiers are invariably operating not under the LOAC/IHL<br />

but in accordance with national domestic law, or the rules governing use of force by an<br />

occupying power; they are operating among the civilian population; and the<br />

distinctions, as has been argued above, between combatant and non-combatant may be<br />

obscured – often deliberately. At the same time that they may be operating in an<br />

unfamiliar manner, restrained in the use of force, they could be dealing with an enemy<br />

who, through atrocity and through attacks that cannot easily be responded to, seeks to<br />

cause frustration, anger and extreme emotional duress that may cause over-reaction<br />

including indiscriminate and disproportionate responses.<br />

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