CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

(Of course, history was to show he could be equally successful at achieving the opposite
effect, in 2003.)
In noting this optimism and near-unanimity it is important not to over-stress it. There
was division and there was scepticism, particularly from the UK, as to the viability of
taking the UN route to a solution. Thatcher was the leading sceptic, unconvinced that
the UN could deliver, as her memoirs show: 46
This meeting * also saw the beginning of an almost interminable argument
between the Americans – particularly Jim Baker – and me about whether and in
what form United Nations authority was needed for measures against Saddam
Hussein. I felt that the Security Council Resolution which had already been
passed † , combined with our ability to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter, on
self defence, was sufficient. …… (M)y attitude, which had been reinforced as
a result of our difficulties with the UN over the Falklands, was based on two
considerations. Firstly, there was no guarantee that the wording of a resolution,
which was always open to amendment, would finish up by being satisfactory. …
…
Second, although I am a strong believer in international law, I did not like
unnecessary resort to the UN, because it suggested that sovereign states lacked
the moral authority to act on their own behalf. … … The UN was a useful – for
some matters vital – forum. But it was hardly the nucleus of a new world order.
Encapsulated in this short passage is a summary of all the traditional doubts about the
role of the UN: its inability to take resolute action, its openness to political bias rather
than subjective application of law, the danger of the veto rendering it impotent, and an
ideological objection to the very idea of any authority greater than that of sovereign
states.
Nevertheless, the gradual build up of US-led coalition forces, initially for the defence of
Saudi Arabia against any further Iraqi expansionism but eventually clearly intended for
the forcible removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, continued to enjoy increasing UN
authority for action. Any doubt that might still have existed in some minds was finally
removed by Resolution 678 of 29 Nov 1990 47 (original emphasis):
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
* On Sunday 5 Aug 1990 in the Whitehouse with US President George Bush, National Security Advisor
Brent Scowcroft, Vice President Dan Quayle and Secretary of State James Baker.
† SCR 660. It was regarded as sufficient authority for use of force in that it determined the existence of a
‘breach of international peace and security’ – generally taken as the cue for actions under Chapter VII.
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