CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

threats before they become imminent. It’s too late if they become imminent. It’s too
late in this new kind of war.’ 208
It is clear, then, that the contemporary security environment offers challenges to our
traditional understanding of justified pre-emption. However, the challenge need not be
so much to the theory as the practical application. The new threats – in particular the
combined threat of WMD and terrorism – may require a revised understanding of
imminence but this does not argue for abandoning last resort as a principle; it simply
suggests that it is reached earlier in time or distance. If we are to justify pre-emption
without such justification acting as a cover for unjustifiable preventive war, then, as is
the case with intervention, we need a framework of understanding within which to
conduct the debate. The clear cut rule established by Webster in 1838 may no longer be
appropriate but carte blanche in pre-emption, like unfettered interventionism, offers a
prospect of a dangerous, violent and unstable world. Byers warns that stretching the
definition of imminence introduces
much more ambiguity into the law. This ambiguity could in turn, allow power
and influence to play a greater role in the application of the law. In future,
whether the criteria of imminence is fulfilled would depend in large part on the
factual circumstances – as assessed by individual states and groups of states.
And the ability of the powerful to influence these assessments could be
considerable….. 209
This would inevitably leave the most powerful countries, and the United States in
particular, with a greater freedom of action. Similarly, Rob de Wijk warns of the
difficulty of amending existing convention:
Where does one draw the line? Is it a perceived intent of a state to acquire
weapons of mass destruction or to support international terrorism? Or is it the
possession of these weapons or the existence of terrorist groups in a state? Thus,
critics of the 2002 National Security Strategy feared that the setting of new
standards for pre-emption could result in the death of the UN Charter
framework. 210
Perhaps, then, as with intervention, we are better claiming exceptional violation rather
than changing the rules. Moreover, alongside last resort we must consider the jus ad
bellum tenet of right authority. Pre-emptive action is much more palatable if it enjoys
widespread international support as we have seen from the contrasting cases of the 1967
Arab-Israeli war and the 1982 attack on the Osirak reactor.
235