CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

With the campaign ‘won’ (i.e. Serbia having agreed to de-facto NATO control of
Kosovo), continued over-caution and under-manning prevented effective control of the
movement of Albanian-rebels across the Kosovo-Macedonia border that was a
significant factor in the dangerous instability and crisis that hit Macedonia in early
2001. In the Spring of 2001 a more robust approach by the US highlighted earlier
failure:
After nearly two years in which self-protection has been their main
preoccupation, American soldiers have at last begun foot patrols along the
south-east border which they are supposed to secure.
All the signs are that they have left it far too late. From the American
base mortar fire can be heard rolling of the walls of the neighbouring valley. It
is the sound of fighting between Macedonian troops and ethnic Albanian rebels,
who until recently moved almost at will across the frontier from Kosovo to
establish bases from which to launch a guerrilla campaign in Macedonia.
The American rules of engagement mean that even now the rebels have
little to fear. … (T)he soldiers have no mandate to use force. Only when fired
on do they have the right to fire back.
Critics say the Americans’ unconfrontational instincts are shared by all 37, 000
NATO-led troops in Kosovo. No one has shown much appetite to take on the
gun culture that after 21 months of relative peace still lurks below the surface of
Kosovo society. 56
Policing the UN-mandated no-fly zones in Iraq suffered similarly according to some:
American military commanders have recommended reducing patrols of the “nofly”
zones over Iraq because of an increasing risk that they may be shot down.
Army General Tommy Franks and Air Force General Joseph Ralston
expressed concern about escalating Iraqi attempts to shoot down British and US
aircraft, Pentagon officials said yesterday. 57
Indeed, some have argued that it was concern over the prospect of casualties being
taken in implementing the no-fly zones that both rendered ineffective the Clinton
Administration’s policy of containing Saddam’s regime and, thereby, led to the Bush
Administration’s determination to take decisive military action to remove the regime
entirely. 58 Thomas Ricks’ examination of the failure of US policy in Iraq also hints at
this. Describing the 1998 DESERT FOX bombing and Cruise missile attacks on Iraq
as ‘the most intense enforcement of the containment policy that occurred in the entire
twelve-year period between the 1991 war and the 2003 invasion’ 59 Ricks notes that
despite the military assessment of greater than expected impact on the Iraqi regime,
critics of the containment policy – and those who saw the raids as an attempt to divert
attention from the forthcoming impeachment proceedings against Clinton – were
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