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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

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intervention. Even the more national-interest criteria-formulations of Weinberger-<br />

Powell and PDD 25 contain identifiably just war elements (especially reasonable chance<br />

of success), though rather more heavily laced with the strategic caution we have noted<br />

from Gray (see p9 and p191). What is necessary now is to consider the potential<br />

difficulties that use of a just war framework might involve. Like the ICISS we should<br />

perhaps devote greatest attention to Just Cause and Proper Authority, though Right<br />

Intent will also be considered. In the next chapter, when considering issues of jus in<br />

bello, due consideration will be given to issues of conduct of humanitarian<br />

interventions, particularly with regard to the impact of technology on proportionality.<br />

3.3.4.1 Just Cause in Humanitarian Intervention<br />

The problem with humanitarianism as an all-embracing just cause is that it is neither<br />

well defined nor as universally understood as many liberal-interventionists would insist.<br />

(See, for example E H Carr’s realist critique of liberal moral universalism, discussed at<br />

p7). Rob de Wijk notes:<br />

In Asia, for the most part, authoritarian state and family structures dominate and<br />

democracy and individual rights are secondary. Islamic countries mostly reject<br />

the Western separation of church and state.<br />

China not only continued to criticize the Western conception of democracy, but<br />

also questioned the universality of the declaration of Human Rights. Consistent<br />

with the Confucian civilization, the rulers in Beijing maintained that individual<br />

human rights are subordinated to collective state rights. This means that in<br />

China democracy will have a different meaning than in the West. China’s<br />

criticism made clear that so-called universal values were not considered<br />

universal by everyone. 118<br />

De Wijk goes on to point out the inconsistencies that arise from the West’s mixing of<br />

ideology and strategic interest in its foreign policies; inconsistencies that both confuse<br />

and anger non-Western states:<br />

Western governments declared genocide in Bosnia sufficient grounds for<br />

intervention, but largely ignored genocide in Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan; nonproliferation<br />

is considered important for Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and India, but not<br />

for Israel; Saddam Hussein’s annexation of Kuwait was not tolerated, but<br />

Turkish partition of Cyprus, the Indian takeover of Goa and the Indonesian<br />

seizure of East Timor were; China’s human rights policies were criticized, but<br />

human rights abuses by allies in the Gulf region, such as Egypt and Saudi<br />

Arabia, were tolerated. 119<br />

201

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