CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

The non-cooperation of the Khmer Rouge was a thorn in the side of the mission
throughout its duration and also serves to highlight the difficulties faced by a mission
that relies on consent and rigid impartiality. Shawcross 77 draws attention to one
incident in particular that seriously dented the mission’s credibility and left it looking
impotent in the face of intransigence and hostility of one of the parties. Travelling
together into Khmer Rouge held territory, Akashi and Sanderson were stopped at a
check point. This was a clear and blatant breach of the treaty, the road block was only
lightly manned and Sanderson could have used force to allow them passage. Concerned
that confronting the Khmer Rouge would lead to open hostility for which the UN force
was ill-equipped, Akashi and Sanderson turned back.
If at one level complete impartiality is a problem, then at another actual or perceived
partiality on the part of one or more troop contingents can be equally damaging. In
UNTAC’s case it was the Indonesians who were cause for concern, perceived as being
far too close to the Khmer Rouge 78 .
UNTAC is an important case-study because it was so ambitious an undertaking but also
because it was the first UN peacekeeping operation of the post-Cold War era. Many of
the failings it exemplified were, sadly, portentous of what was to come.
Whilst establishing UNTAC the UN, and in particular its undermanned, over-stretched
DPKO (see comments by Richard Holbrooke cited on p86), had also to contend with the
unfolding crisis in the collapsing Yugoslavia. Brendan Simms, who has been
particularly damning of the UK’s policy towards the Balkan crises of the 1990s 79
identifies the fundamental mistake of the British Government as identifying the problem
of Bosnia as ‘primarily a humanitarian problem, rather than as a colossal politico-
strategic challenge…’ 80 This, however, was also the UN’s mistake, as indicated by the
fact that the appointed lead agency for the emerging crisis was not DPKO but the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The policy seems to have been from the
outset one not of intervention but of pointed non-intervention, backed by an attempt to
secure the delivery of humanitarian aid and then to impose and monitor an arms
embargo.
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