CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

action. 143 For just one example of a failure to plan, consider the state of the Iraqi health
service; already in a dire state as a result of years of external sanctions and
mismanagement by the regime, this once first world standard health service was
decimated by the mis-judged policy of de-ba’athification; there was no plan in place to
provide even the basics of a civilian health service as the US and UK forces became the
occupying power. 144 Richard Holmes makes the following point:
It is possible that had the coalition been ready to exploit the brief honeymoon
period that followed its victory with the rapid rebuilding of the battered
infrastructure and the nourishment of soft security, then the slide towards
disorder might have been checked early on. But by the time the coalition bent
its nerve towards these objectives the metronome had ticked on, and events on
the ground were moving faster than the coalition’s policy makers reckoned. 145
Yet even in 2004, a year after the end of ‘major combat operations’, there was little
evidence to troops on the ground of any significant effort to address wider stability and
reconstruction efforts:
In Maysan province there was not a single official of the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office to provide political, cultural or any other form of advice.
The commanding officer, an infantryman with a degree in agricultural
economics, was left to get on with it. There were two policy advisers
(POLADs) who served with the battle group during its time in Al Amarah.
Neither had a diplomatic background, spoke any Arabic, or had worked in or on
the region; one came from a weapons procurement background. … …
Equally there was little real help with reconstruction and aid projects.
The Department for International Development (DfID) was not represented. 146
Central to Kenneth Roth’s 147 argument, referred to above (see p207), about the invasion
of Iraq is that the failure to take account of the Iraqi people’s perspective undermines
claims to humanitarianism. The ICISS approach also seeks to refocus the debate away
from the intervener and his claimed cause and onto the alleged victims and intentions
toward them 148 :
The Commission is of the view that the debate about intervention for human
protection purposes should focus not on “the right to intervene” but on “the
responsibility to protect.” The proposed change in terminology is also a change
in perspective, reversing the perceptions inherent in the traditional language,
and adding some additional ones:
First, the responsibility to protect implies an evaluation of the issues
from the point of view of those seeking or needing support, rather than
those who may be considering intervention. Our preferred terminology
refocuses the international searchlight back where it should always be:
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