Global Report on Human Settlements 2007 - PoA-ISS

182
Natural and human-made disasters
Table 7.8
Natural disasters and
socio-political change
Source: Pelling, 2003; except *:
Dill and Pelling, 2006
City (country) Date of disaster Disaster trigger Socio-political reaction
Lice (Turkey) 1972 Earthquake Discrimination against the minority Kurdish population was blamed for inadequate preparedness before,
and relief aid after, the earthquake. Complaints were made by a Kurdish member of parliament to the
Turkish Parliament.
Managua (Nicaragua) 1972 Earthquake The scale of corruption by the Somoza dictatorship united workers, intellectuals, the business community
and international popular opinion fuelling a popular revolution that eventually led to a change in regime.
Guatemala City (Guatemala) 1976 Earthquake Described as a ‘classquake’ because of its high impact among slum dwellers, this event stimulated
popular mobilization and land invasions, which reshaped the geography of the city.
(Chile, nationwide) 1985 Earthquake A traditional civilian response threatened to undermine a weak dictatorship. The response was
demobilized through repression and the state took over.
Mexico City (Mexico) 1985 Earthquake Inadequate state response. A highly organized civil society-led reconstruction programme emerged,
unique in Mexico’s modern history of authoritarian state control.
Miami (US) 1992 Hurricane Broad interest coalitions formed, assisting in the rebuilding of the city. These coalitions have not persisted
but have created the potential for cooperation in local politics.
Marmara * (Turkey) 1999 Earthquake A conspicuous failure in state oversight of the construction industry led to riots and political lobbying for
policy change.
…political relations
at the local level will
be tested by disaster
events …
space. It may be possible to assess how disaster risk reduction,
the hazard events themselves and their aftermath open
or close political space. In other words, do the activities
conducted during these periods of disaster management
provide an opportunity for inclusive governance? Disasters
can act as catalysts highlighting underlying inequality, corruption
and incompetence that fuels popular unrest; but they
can also close political space. More authoritarian political
regimes whose legitimacy is built on the control of political
power in a national state are likely to feel threatened by any
opening of political space through disaster, and so may be
expected to act to restrain emerging civil society voices.
Entrenched political systems are difficult to change and single
disaster events rarely achieve significant political movement,
unless this was already entrained before the event.
Table 7.8 presents information from studies of disasters
that have had a mainly urban impact and were triggered
by a natural hazard. In many cases, it was the capital city that
was hit, with political consequences for the nation as a
whole. In cases where the formal state response has been
politically biased (Turkey in 1972) or inadequate (Mexico
City in 1985; Turkey in 1999), civil society responses have
emerged or even come to dominate disaster relief, recovery
(Chile in 1985; Mexico City in 1985) and reconstruction
(Guatemala City in 1976). In many cases, civil society efforts
can become formalized when interest groups have created
coalitions with the state (Miami in 1992; Mexico City in
1985; Turkey in 1999) or protested through formal political
or legislative channels (Turkey in 1972). Where political
differences between the cooperating groups are too large,
collaboration may not last long beyond the disaster reconstruction
period (Miami in 1992); but even here the
experience is likely to have built up new trust between civil
society groups within the city.
State elites can benefit from disaster when, for
example, the political function of party networks is adapted
for relief distribution or institutional weaknesses allow
corruption (Managua in 1972), thus strengthening ‘clientalism’
in society. This suggests that it can be in the interest of
parasitic governing elites to allow degeneration in the institutions
overseeing disaster response (providing a space for
corruption), while investing in state control over local disaster
response strategies (to prevent the emergence of
potentially critical civil society organizations). Where states
do not benefit from disaster, astute politicians can control
potential damage. In 1966, despite having made decisions
that directly led to increased vulnerability to flooding in New
Orleans, the incumbent mayor was successfully re-elected,
having demonstrated leadership in reconstruction. 47
Beyond the national level, political relations at the
local level will be tested by disaster events and also by risk
reduction and reconstruction interventions. If disaster risk
reduction is to be effective in changing the root causes of
risk, then change in local social and political relations –
between gender, economic class, cast, and ethnic and
religious groups – is a legitimate target for action. Even where
change is not intended, this may often be an unplanned
outcome of interventions, with positive and negative consequences
for those affected. For all disaster types at the local
level, periods of disaster and emergency response – especially
if these are prolonged – can result in dislocations in the
authority of the state and the emergence of, if only temporarily,
alternative forms of social organization. Disasters can also
lead to more positive social bonding and the building of trust
between people forced together by adversity.
Cultural impacts of disaster
Urban areas concentrate cultural assets, including architecturally
significant buildings and urban landscapes, but also
artworks housed in urban centres. The Jahrhundertflut flood
of August 2002 that affected the Czech Republic, Germany
and Hungary, is one recent example where cultural assets
were at risk. The World Heritage towns of Cesky Krumlov and
Prague were damaged and large galleries in Dresden and
Prague were flooded. In Prague, flooding in the National
Museum and Prague University of Technology caused damage
to books, including an archive on Czech architecture. The
vulnerability of the historic city of Genoa (Italy) further illustrates
the cultural impacts of disasters (see Box 7.7).
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage List
includes 644 cultural and 24 mixed cultural and natural
properties (including an additional 162 natural properties,
such as nature parks). Many of these sites are located in
earthquake-risk hotspots in Central America and Central Asia