Global Report on Human Settlements 2007 - PoA-ISS

Enhancing tenure security and ending forced evictions
277
Zimbabwe are indicative of this trend, as she recommends
that the government ‘should hold to account those responsible
for the injury caused by the operation’ (see Box 5.14).
A global moratorium on forced evictions
Examples the world over have shown that forced evictions
are not an inevitable consequence of economic development,
nor are they the necessary price of progress or an
adjunct to civic infrastructure improvements. Forced
evictions are a largely preventable source of inconceivable
human anguish. While some evictions may be impossible to
avoid (under exceptional circumstances), the overwhelming
majority of the forced evictions already carried out and those
that are planned can be prevented and ultimately made
unnecessary. An initial global moratorium on forced
evictions, therefore, over a period of five years could be one
concrete means for ending a practice that patently violates a
range of recognized human rights.
United Nations member states could proclaim such a
moratorium at a future United Nations General Assembly
session. During the five-year moratorium period, each state
would cease carrying out forced evictions, review domestic
legislation on these practices, carry out any legislative
reform required to adequately protect people against forced
eviction, all the while taking a series of well-financed and
concerted series of steps to confer security of tenure on all
of the world’s communities currently without such protections.
This initial five-year period would see national security
of tenure action plans developed in all member states. Such
plans could be coordinated by initiatives such as the <strong>Global</strong>
Campaign for Secure Tenure and would involve more
positive and suitable approaches to security of tenure emerging,
combined with renewed commitments and resources
dedicated to the improvement of existing homes and
communities.
NOTES
A global mechanism to monitor the
realization of housing rights
As noted in Chapter 6, there is a glaring lack of accurate and
comprehensive data on security of tenure and forced
evictions. Similarly, there is also a scarcity of data on other
components of the right to adequate housing. This is so
despite the fact that all state parties to the ICESCR are
required, by international law, to submit such data to the
CESCR every five years (see Box 5.4). Several different
efforts are already under way to collect such data, including
as part of the effort to report on the implementation of the
MDG on improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by
2020. Yet, it is time for the establishment of a mechanism to
collect a comprehensive set of data on the progressive
realization of HLP rights. The effort to design and implement
a set of housing rights indicators by the United Nations
Housing Rights Programme (see Box 5.5) is an important
step in this direction since it gives advocates and governments
alike information needed to establish benchmarks,
evaluate success (and failure) and implement effective
policies.
Perhaps the time for addressing this in a more
compressive manner has arrived, with the ongoing reform of
the human rights framework and mechanisms within the
United Nations system, including that of treaty bodies, in
general, and the reporting procedure, in particular. It has
been argued that use of appropriate indicators for assessing
human rights implementation could contribute to streamlining
the reporting process, make it more transparent and
effective, reduce the reporting burden, and, above all,
improve follow-up on the recommendations and concluding
observations of the CESCR at the national level. The ongoing
work of the United Nations Housing Rights Programme
regarding the development of housing rights indicators is a
good start and should be supported, particularly in the
context of developing a comprehensive mechanism for
continuous monitoring of the progressive realization of all
human rights.
A global moratorium
on forced evictions
… could be one
concrete means for
ending a practice
that … violates a
range of … human
rights
It is time for the
establishment of a
mechanism to
collect a comprehensive
set of data on
the progressive
realization of HLP
rights
1 See, for instance, COHRE,
2006.
2 See CESCR, General
Comment No 15.
3 UN-Habitat, 2004b.
4 ICESCR, Article 11(1).
5 CESCR, General Comment
No 4, para 8. For an indepth
analysis of the right to
adequate housing, see UN-
Habitat and OHCHR, 2002.
6 CESCR, General Comment
No 4.
7 Ibid, para 11.
8 ICESCR, Article 2(1).
9 Commission on Human
Rights, Resolution 1993/77.
10 Commission on Human
Rights, Resolution 2004/28.
11 UN Document
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2,
Principle 6.
12 CESCR, General Comment
No 7, para 18. See also UN-
Habitat and OHCHR, 2002.
13 See United Nations Human
Rights Committee, General
Comment No 27, para 7.
14 Approved in 2005 by the
United Nations Sub-
Commission on the
Protection and Promotion
of Human Rights. See also
FAO et al (2007) for practical
ways of implementing
the Pinheiro Principles.
15 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 17.
16 Schabas, 1991.
17 CESCR, General Comment
No 4, para 7.
18 Buyse, 2006.
19 See Leckie (2003b), which
provides an overview of
more than 12 restitution
initiatives.
20 UN Documents
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17,
Principle 2.1. Additional
relevant provisions can be
found throughout Principles
2 and 10.
21 Williams, 2006, p173.
22 Leckie, 2005a.
23 World Bank, 2003b, p186.
24 Payne, 2001b, p8.
25 Payne, 2005.
26 UNCHS and ILO, 1995.
27 Payne, 2002.
28 A favela is an informal
settlement, normally found
in the periphery of the city.
In contrast, cortiços are
overpopulated high rises.
29 Payne, 2005.
30 United Nations, 2005.
31 Payne and Majale, 2004.
32 1998 Maastricht Guidelines
on Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.
33 Karapuu and Rosas, 1990
(Act No 380/1987, Article
8(2) and Child Welfare Act
No 683/1983, respectively).
34 1994 German Federal
Welfare Assistance Act,
sections 15(a) and 72,
respectively.
35 CESCR, General Comment
No 7, para 16.
36 Ibid, para 14.
37 International Council on
Human Rights Policy, 2005.
38 Ibid.
39 Durand-Lasserve, 1998,
p242.
40 See www.unglobalcompact.
org/AboutTheGC/TheTen
Principles/principle1.html.
41 See www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId
=9013904&contentId=7026
915.
42 Clapham, 2006.
43 Ibid, p222.
44 See, for example, Article 49
of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of
War, and Article 17 of
Protocol II to the Geneva
Convention.