Global Report on Human Settlements 2007 - PoA-ISS

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292 Towards safer and more secure cities Box 12.12 Lessons learned for knowledge management and evacuation planning during Hurricane Rita, US (2005) Whereas Hurricane Katrina’s evacuation plan functioned relatively well for motorists, but failed to serve people who depend upon public transport, Hurricane Rita’s evacuation plan failed because of excessive reliance on automobiles, resulting in traffic congestion and local fuel shortages. Three days before Hurricane Rita made landfall, an evacuation plan that would see over 1 million people leave their homes was begun. On 21 September 2005, a staggered evacuation order was announced for Galveston County and city. The system of staggered evacuation and the designation of particular evacuation routes and destination cities for different zones of the county and city were aimed at preventing traffic congestion. Evaluations of the evacuation have identified a number of communication failures and weaknesses. Training and planning needs to include those local authorities involved in evacuation. This can help, for example, in streamlining traffic control to reduce congestion, and in the provision of sanitary facilities and primary healthcare along evacuation routes. Public education is needed to inform people of evacuation routes and destinations, and to provide advice on the need to prepare adequately for long journey times by taking adequate water, food, medications, etc. Conflicting information from state and media weather bulletins and approaches to providing information led to confusion. At times, the media sensationalized the nature of the hazard, adding unnecessarily to tension. This had an exaggerated impact, given the recent nature of Hurricane Katrina. Elected officials need to take control and act as figure heads to reassure people and project a sense of responsibility. A number of recommendations have come from reviews of communication and information flow during the Rita evacuation. While communication between state and local government was good, there was a disconnection between public agencies and the people. This needs to be improved. Simple actions, such as providing more roadside signs about fuel and water, have been proposed, as has a statewide public education programme. Source: Gutierrez, 2005 …reconstruction governance is made complicated by ad hoc legislative and institutional frameworks generating uncoordinated and fragmented action implementing assisted evacuation. Participatory risk mapping can also be used to identify local resources, including evacuation routes and buildings that can be converted into public shelters. For the majority of residents in many cities, resources are not available for long distance evacuation; so local plans based on local knowledge can help to bring order and clarity. An additional advantage to decentralized planning is the capacity for local plans to be implemented even if national or city-wide communications and plans fail. However, the most effective local systems do not operate in isolation. Liaisons between adjacent communities and with city or national disaster planning authorities can improve the performance of early warning and action through exposure to the experiences of other communities and national standards of good practice. IMPROVING EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND RECONSTRUCTION Urban areas offer specific challenges for emergency response and recovery (see also Chapter 7). Key challenges for emergency responders include: • The existence of the majority of settlements in cities of developing countries outside the formal and legal system: at best, there are restricted land rights and documentation. • The mobility of responders can be inhibited by large quantities of debris. Consequently, in some cases, communities may not receive adequate medical supplies, food, water and security for weeks. • Public services may be inadequate, such as, for instance, the lack of available water through the public distribution system for fire fighting. • Secondary disasters (such as fires, toxic spills and other industrial accidents) complicate and hinder rescue efforts (e.g. fire, smoke, gases). • Information management for decision-making becomes more complicated and difficult in larger settlements. From the perspective of emergency services, resilience can be built into risk management through making use of redundant capacity. In cities exposed to frequent events, spare capacity should be extended to mobilize materials, such as medical stock, temporary accommodation, equipment, and mobile water and sanitation units. Capacity can also be extended by involving community actors and the wider civil society in first-response planning and training. The Iranian Red Crescent has promoted disaster-response training, with over 1.2 million people trained. 51 Coordination of emergency response efforts between different urban sectors remains a key challenge. It is particularly important to synchronize response efforts that involve critical services such as medical assistance, electricity and water services. The case of Nanning City’s Urban Emergency Response Centre in China illustrates the mechanisms for establishing an integrated disaster response system (see Box 12.13) Post-disaster recovery is also challenged, particularly if this period is to make the most of its opportunity for ‘building back better’ to reduce risk and integrate development within reconstruction. The gap in funding and planning between response, recovery and development continues. On the ground, reconstruction governance is made complicated by ad hoc legislative and institutional frameworks generating uncoordinated and fragmented action. There is no agency devoted to housing reconstruction, and very few of the major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in relief would claim to specialize here. UN-Habitat’s increasing involvement in reconstruction is a progressive indication of the positive contribution to be made by developmental actors. Future improvements in recovery and reconstruction might come from approaches that build on local and national capaci-
Mitigating the impacts of disasters 293 Box 12.13 Integrated Urban Emergency Response Centre, Nanning, China Nanning City is located in southwest China, with a population of 1.7 million and a built area of 170 square kilometres. The city has experienced rapid urbanization over the last decade, with its population growing by 172 per cent. This has been accompanied by increased threats to safety and security, including natural and human-made disasters. The old emergency response system, characterized by fragmented agencies, was poorly adapted to the changing environment of the city. Thus, the city established an Emergency Response Center, a successful example of an integrated emergency response system. The Center, the first of its kind in China, started to provide emergency services in November 2001 by integrating telephone calls for the Police Service (110), Fire Service (119), Ambulance Service (120), Traffic Accident (122), Mayor’s Hot Line (12345), and other emergency response systems for Source: Nanning Municipal Government, 2007 flood, earthquake, water, electricity and gas supplies. To prevent emergencies and disasters, and to minimize their impact, the Center has prepared numerous prevention and emergency response programmes for natural disasters, public health, management of dangerous chemicals, housing safety, school safety and public space safety. This Center, consisting of 15 sub-units, has the following technical capabilities: • to identify immediately, with the support of GIS and GPS systems, the location of incoming calls from among nearly 1 million landline telephones, and display the distribution of all police units; • to identify the location of available rescue resources and make the best choice of response; • to transmit voice, image and document information between the Center and the site of the emergency; • to monitor, record and intervene traffic conditions; • to set up temporary command stations at emergency sites and provide commanding and communication serves by deploying emergency mobile communication vehicles; and • to record all relevant voice and digital information for each case for further search. The Center has improved the overall efficiency and coverage of emergency responses in the city, particularly rescue services. The experience of the Center shows that a municipal government can successfully mobilize stakeholders and use modern technologies to create a safer living environment for its residents. ties, and which experiment with more decentralized planning and programming that builds on pre-disaster risk reduction. Speed and sustainability in shelter provision A longstanding tension in reconstruction is between the demands of delivering basic needs, including shelter, quickly, and the desire for sustainability, which requires greater participation and a longer time commitment. Fair and efficient distribution of housing that provides a basis for economic development and resilience building is repeatedly undermined by a rapid and fragmented approach to shelter reconstruction, which does not consider the economic, social and environmental consequences of reconstruction decisions. Part of this challenge is conceptual and lies in the very nature of housing, which, unlike other relief items such as food aid or medicine, is a significant, long-term and non-consumable asset. While the logic for humanitarian actors to lead in the post-disaster provision of life-saving medical care is clear, this is less so for settlement reconstruction, which is, at heart, a developmental activity requiring the skills and knowledge of housing and urban development specialists. Reconstruction in Bam during 2003 – one of the first times that UN-Habitat had been formally consulted on post-natural disaster reconstruction planning – shows that the integration of development within shelter reconstruction is rare. 52 The disconnection between shelter reconstruction and development is perhaps also partly a reason for the many instances where temporary shelter is not replaced and becomes, de facto, permanent. In Santo Domingo (the Dominican Republic), public confidence in the ability of the state to adequately deliver reconstruction following Hurricane Georges in 1998 was severely undermined by the knowledge that many still remained in ‘temporary’ housing built after Hurricane David struck in 1979. In extensive disasters, a scarcity of large construction firms can lead to the creation of virtual monopolies, forcing up prices to exorbitant levels and creating a long waiting time for completion. The long waiting period for temporary housing following Hurricane Katrina has contributed to anxiety and financial hardship among those affected. An awareness of the opportunity for shelter provision to contribute to longer-term development has stimulated some reappraisal by humanitarian and development agencies of the processes through which shelter is provided. It is important that, as far as possible, those people whose homes have been lost or damaged in disaster are involved in repair and reconstruction. This saves costs, provides a mechanism for transferring new or improved construction skills and can bolster the local economy. Time and again, survivors of disaster express a preference for working on reconstruction, rather than being made to receive aid in temporary camps. Where possible, survivors should be allowed to return to the sites of their former occupation and begin reconstruction as soon as possible. Where the costs of reconstruction are affordable, this can further enable survivors to take over the process of providing their own shelter. Where settlements have suffered great damage or been shown, through disaster, to be at unacceptable levels of hazard exposure, settlement planning and, in extreme cases, relocation will still be required. This opens a rare opportunity for progressive land-use and ownership planning, including the extension of basic services for those people who may previously have lived on the margins of urban life. It is commonplace for landownership to be disputed in the aftermath of a disaster, which is made worse by a lack of documentation or the destruction of local public offices that held records. Networked electronic databases of citizen A longstanding tension in reconstruction is between the demands of delivering basic needs… and the desire for sustainability…
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ENHANCING URBAN SAFETY AND SECURITY
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First published by Earthscan in the
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INTRODUCTION Enhancing Urban Safety
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The preparation of
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x Enhancing Urban Safety and Securi
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xviii Enhancing Urban Safety and Se
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LIST OF FIGURES, BOXES AND TABLES F
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1 CHAPTER CURRENT THREATS TO URBAN
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2 CHAPTER VULNERABILITY, RISK AND R
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Vulnerability, risk and resilience:
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29 simply ‘give up’ in the face
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46 Urban crime and violence Box II.
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48 Urban crime and violence it has
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50 Urban crime and violence Formal
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52 Urban crime and violence Contact
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54 Urban crime and violence Per 100
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56 Urban crime and violence Burglar
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58 Urban crime and violence Percent
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60 Urban crime and violence Figure
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62 Urban crime and violence Table 3
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68 Urban crime and violence Type of
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76 Urban crime and violence Abused
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78 Urban crime and violence General
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82 Urban crime and violence porate
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86 Urban crime and violence UN-Habi
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92 Urban crime and violence Legisla
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98 Urban crime and violence Availab
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100 Urban crime and violence Box 4.
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102 Urban crime and violence In som
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104 Urban crime and violence Initia
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112 Security of tenure Box III.1 Se
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5 CHAPTER SECURITY OF TENURE: CONDI
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116 Security of tenure Table 5.1 A
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118 Security of tenure Fully legal
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120 Security of tenure Box 5.4 Secu
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122 Security of tenure Urban tenure
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124 Security of tenure At least 2 m
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126 Security of tenure Market-based
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128 Security of tenure Box 5.11 Urb
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130 Security of tenure Operation Mu
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132 Security of tenure Control of l
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134 Security of tenure Box 5.18 Sec
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136 Security of tenure NOTES 1 Habi
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138 Security of tenure Box 6.1 The
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140 Security of tenure It would be
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142 Security of tenure Box 6.7 Land
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144 Security of tenure Box 6.10 Wha
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154 Security of tenure Box 6.24 Lan
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156 Security of tenure The state is
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158 Security of tenure Housing righ
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Introduction 165 One of the key tre
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7 CHAPTER DISASTER RISK: CONDITIONS
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Disaster risk: Conditions, trends a
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INDEX ACHR (Asian Coalition for Hou
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Index 435 security of tenure 134 co
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Index 437 domestic abuse see intima
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Index 439 hazard management 169 haz
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Index 441 Kosovo, security of tenur
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Index 443 participation 38, 296-299
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Index 445 individual 34-35 municipa
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Index 447 gun ownership 78 Homeless
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