Global Report on Human Settlements 2007 - PoA-ISS

Policy responses to disaster risk
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by strengthening community understanding of risk, information
networks and disaster response of partners and
communities. This is an example of an early warning project
embedded within a wider risk reduction programme. It
involved administrative representatives, health and education
staff, local Red Cross representatives, and the
sub-commissions for education and civil protection set up in
the wake of the volcanic eruption of 2002. 73
Box 8.14 presents a success story of a people-centred
early warning experience from Honduras that built local
resilience through early warning, even when national early
warning systems failed.
Effective early warning requires trust between those
giving and receiving information. Some degree of coordination
can give legitimacy to national early warning systems,
although this is not always the case, especially where past
experience of the state has eroded local trust in its institutions.
The experience of La Masica is not unique in showing
the advantages of decentralized systems. Transparent and
clear information flows can help to build trust by constraining
opportunities for the concealment of imminent hazards.
Local and national governments have sometimes kept the
public in the dark when receiving technical information on
imminent threats to prevent unease among investors,
especially in tourist economies. There are also cases where
the public may refuse to heed early warnings from authorities.
In both cases, clear and balanced information is critical,
even when some level of uncertainty remains. 74
Communicating risk to the public is less problematic
in urban than rural areas because of the high density of
communication infrastructure and social networks. This may
not hold true for smaller, isolated and informal settlements
or slums. Maintaining early warning communication systems
where hazards are infrequent but potentially capable of
delivering a high impact is especially difficult. Communication
infrastructure may not be tested regularly and
social contacts might be lost over time. One way around this
is to build early warning communication systems on top of
everyday communication networks. For instance, where
mobile phones are common, they offer a potential network
for spreading early warning and preparedness advice.
Response capacity
More difficult in cities is the coordination of action in
response to alerts and early warnings. Pre-planning and clear
communication with the public are needed to prevent
inappropriate action or panic. In Lagos (Nigeria), a city
where trust in officials is strained, more than 1000 people
were killed in 2002, most by drowning, while fleeing in
panic from an explosion in an army barrack. 75 This contrasts
with Hong Kong, where tropical cyclone bulletins include
practical advice on securing homes and businesses and how
to access more information. 76
In congested cities with overburdened transport
networks, evacuation can be challenging. Cuba has perhaps
the best track record on urban evacuation with a wellmanaged
and frequently practised evacuation strategy as part
of its risk reduction system (see Box 8.15). Clear lines of
Box 8.14 People-centred early warning: La Masica, Honduras
The experience of La Masica in Honduras shows that small urban centres can successfully build
their own resilience to disaster risk through people-centred early warning. The system developed
in La Masica is relatively low cost and operates independently of outside information flows
or resources, thus increasing its robustness during times of emergency.
La Masica’s early warning system was put to the test during Hurricane Mitch in 1998.
Hurricane Mitch killed over 20,000 people in Nicaragua and Honduras. In La Masica, despite
flooding and economic damage caused by the nearby River Lean, none of the municipality’s
25,000 residents was killed.
The early warning system had been initiated a few years before Hurricane Mitch, with
the full involvement of the municipality’s residents. The area had suffered in 1974 from
Hurricane Fifi, and from smaller flooding incidents. Recognition of the community’s high
exposure to hazard catalysed the local early warning and preparedness programme. The
programme included participatory risk assessments with local people observing river flow, the
establishment of a local risk management organization, and the drawing-up of emergency plans
for responding to rising water levels. Many of those involved in the programme were women.
The success of La Masica’s local early warning system contrasts with the national flood
warning system, which was disabled by flood waters and technical difficulties with satellite data.
In this case, local organization based on simple technology provided greater resilience than the
national high-tech alternative.
Source: Lavell, 2005, in Wisner et al, 2005
authority and cultural acceptance of large-scale public evacuation
are elements in this success. In 2004, Hurricane
Charley severely damaged 70,000 houses, but killed only
four people thanks, in part, to the evacuation of over 2
million people. 77 The Cuban system contrasts with that of
the US, which has increasingly relied on individuals to take
responsibility for their own evacuation and safety following
an early warning. Huge numbers of people successfully do
this. Over 2.5 million people were evacuated from Florida
following an early warning in advance of Hurricane
Charley. 78 But, as was seen in 2005 during Hurricane
Katrina, there will always be a sizeable urban population who
lacks access to private transportation and will rely upon a
well-organized public evacuation service.
FINANCING URBAN RISK
MANAGEMENT
City authorities seldom generate sufficient funds to meet all
their development and risk reduction needs. Thus, they face
the twin challenge of attracting finance and balancing the
conditionalities that come with this support against local
priorities and strategies for disaster risk management.
Inefficient or inadequate fiscal decentralization further
reduces the financial capacity of local governments. This is
especially the case in poorer or rapidly expanding cities
where the proportion of residents and organizations who
contribute to the city revenue can be low.
National governments finance urban infrastructure
works through project grants or line financing through
ministries with responsibility for infrastructure in the urban
sector. In Guyana, central government is responsible for sea
defence and land drainage work, which nonetheless protects
Effective early
warning requires
trust between those
giving and receiving
information