Global Report on Human Settlements 2007 - PoA-ISS

210
Natural and human-made disasters
Early warning is a
cornerstone of
disaster risk
management
…translating
scientific information
on approaching
hazard into language
that results in action
continues to
challenge risk
managers
tance of securing educational facilities from natural disaster
risk. The fact that many school buildings also double as
shelters in times of emergency also increases the value of
investing in secure construction for schools. Nevertheless,
many schools are not constructed or retrofitted to safe
standards. More than 1000 school children were killed by
inadequate school building standards in Spitak (Armenia) in
1988. 66 The Unit for Sustainable Development and
Environment of the Organization of American States (OAS),
PAHO and ISDR developed a programme, 67 in 1993, to build
disaster resilience in educational services. The programme
has focal points in Argentina, Costa Rica, Peru, Trinidad and
Tobago, the US and Venezuela. In Peru, for example, work on
schools in Quito has revealed design weaknesses, such as
short columns, inappropriate joint designs and lightweight
roofs. In Quebec, the Canadian Red Cross has worked with
teachers to help children aged 5 to 16 psychologically
prepare for the aftermath of natural disasters. 68
Risk to critical infrastructure and service networks in
cities of developing countries is exacerbated by the complexity
of their evolution and maintenance. Design is often
piecemeal, the product of individual infrastructure development
projects, with resulting networks being eclectic and
varying in age, form and operational criteria. This serves to
complicate and delay reconstruction of critical infrastructure
as experts are called in from other cities or overseas. This is
complicated further by informal-sector provision of critical
services, such as potable water and policing. In an increasing
number of cities, informal provision of such services is the
primary distribution mode for the majority of citizens. The
coordinated identification of network vulnerability and
subsequent risk mitigation with informal-sector actors
outside of regulatory control is challenging.
EARLY WARNING
Early warning is a cornerstone of disaster risk management.
Despite this, few cities have early warning systems or even
hold data on past hazards and disaster events. Losses to the
Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the 2003 heat wave in
Europe and the Bhopal chemical gas release in 1984 have all
pointed to gaps in early warning systems that have since
become political priorities for action. There are four
interdependent components of early warning systems: risk
knowledge; monitoring and warning; communication; and
response capacity. 69 The capacity of an entire system is
threatened if any one of these components is weak. This
section reviews policy for early warning, risk knowledge, risk
communication and response capacity.
In 2005, the ISDR undertook a survey of capacities
and gaps in global early warning systems. The survey found
that considerable progress had been made in developing the
knowledge and technical tools required to assess risks and to
generate and communicate predictions and warnings. Early
warning system technologies are now available for almost all
types of hazards and are in operation in at least some parts of
the world. The weakest elements of warning systems
concern warning dissemination and preparedness to act.
Early warnings may fail to reach those who must take action,
and may not be understood or address their concerns. Root
causes appear to be inadequate political commitment, weak
coordination among the various actors, and lack of public
awareness and public participation in the development and
operation of early warning systems. 70
Risk knowledge and warning
Risk assessment is based on the tracking of information on
hazards at a range of scales, from local to global, depending
upon the character of the hazard and the nature of the city’s
vulnerabilities. Many of the techniques discussed earlier in
this chapter can be used to generate baseline data against
which subsequent assessments can measure risk trends.
Shifting social contexts as well as environmental changes can
make historical comparisons of risk over time difficult. An
additional challenge for the monitoring of technological risk
is the secrecy of industrial interests (public as well as
private). For example, both the gas release from Union
Carbide (India) Ltd’s plant in Bhopal in 1984 and the release
of radioactive particles from a nuclear power plant in
Chernobyl (Ukraine) in 1986 were associated with technical
and management failures inside the plants that should have
been detected and responded to by a risk management
system. 71
Risks associated with natural hazards can require
surveillance of physical phenomena locally – as, for example,
in river-level gauges in the city – and at a distance. More
distant measurements of risk can provide additional time for
defensive action to be taken. Examples include water levels
in rivers or dams, satellite tracking of tropical cyclones and
storms, or seismic activity, as done by the International
Tsunami Information Centre warning system. 72
Risk communication
Technologically driven systems for risk identification and
assessment routinely attract investment, as can be seen from
the number of private-sector, national and international
scientific bodies working in this field. But translating scientific
information on approaching hazard into language that
results in action continues to challenge risk managers.
People-centred approaches to risk communication and
planning for appropriate response to early warnings require
systems of communication to be in place and the use of
appropriate language. There are many examples where risk
identification has not led to timely warning and action due to
a lack of clear lines and methods of communication. Seismic
activity resulting in the Indian Ocean Tsunami was detected;
but with no established lines of communication at the international
level, information was not acted upon. Less well
known is the 2002 volcanic lava flow that destroyed 40 per
cent of the town of Goma in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. This event was predicted by a local academic geologist;
but in the absence of a municipal or national early
warning system, his information was not acted upon. In
response, the NGO Concern initiated a Community
Preparedness for Volcano Hazards Programme (2002 to
2004). This programme built local resilience to volcanic risk