Global Report on Human Settlements 2007 - PoA-ISS

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212 Natural and human-made disasters National budgets for disasters tend to prioritize relief and emergency responses Box 8.15 Lessons in risk reduction from Cuba Cuba’s integrated system of disaster risk management has succeeded in saving many lives and has built resilience beyond the level that might be expected from the country’s economic status. Between 1996 and 2002, six hurricanes hit Cuba, causing 16 deaths in Cuba out of the total of 665 deaths they collectively caused. What is Cuba doing right? Central to Cuba’s successful risk reduction is the government’s stated priority that its fundamental commitment during a hurricane is to save lives. The country’s risk reduction plan and disaster preparedness structures support this commitment to save lives through the following: • a disaster preparedness plan, which incorporates a specific focus on the most vulnerable, provides for monitoring their situation and adapts plans to address their specific needs; • the national civil defence structure, which uses sub-national government at the provincial, municipal and local level for disaster preparedness and response (in most disasters, local knowledge and leadership play key but unacknowledged roles in disaster risk reduction; the Cuban model incorporates these as central); • practical, effective lifeline structures, with particular emphasis on mass evacuation and use of safe secure shelters; • a ‘culture of safety’ that creates the trust and awareness necessary to motivate people to cooperate and participate in risk reduction; • citizen participation by incorporating community mobilization in a three-tiered system of participation in planning, community implementation of lifeline structures and the creation and building of social capital. Source: Thompson, 2007 Since 75 per cent of Cuba’s 11 million people are urban, the country’s disaster preparedness plan has a strong focus on being operational in urban areas. Cuba’s model also owes a lot to its unique system of government and its socio-economic model, which has consistently addressed risk reduction through policies of social and economic equity and poverty reduction. These policies have produced ‘multiplier effects’ that enhance risk reduction in many ways. The adult population is 100 per cent literate and therefore can access educational materials about disasters, and all children are exposed to disaster preparedness in school curricula. There is an adequate road system in the country that facilitates speedy evacuation and building codes are enforced, which reduces the element of highly vulnerable substandard construction. Approximately 95 per cent of the households in the country have electricity and therefore can access information about disasters through radio and television. Finally, the intricate web of social, professional and political organizations in the country provides organizational structures that can be quickly mobilized in disaster. Surprisingly, the economic crisis triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union has not affected Cuba’s success in protecting the lives of its population from hurricanes. The Cuban government is unique in that it has paid an equal amount of attention to the structural and physical aspects of disaster preparedness, but also created a ‘culture of safety’ through successful education and awareness campaigns. It has also demonstrated the central importance of management capacity and political will in successful risk reduction. This holds out real possibility and hope for other countries, rich and poor alike, facing the growing dangers of natural hazards. …bilateral and multilateral donors … have a history of supporting disaster reconstruction the capital city, Georgetown, from flooding. Political and personal rivalry between the leaders of city and national governments is, at times, interpreted as a cause for delay or withdrawal of funds. National budgets for disasters tend to prioritize relief and emergency responses. Prevention and mitigation are less attractive as funding choices. After all, governments get less praise from the electorate and the international community for reducing disaster risk than they do for a speedy and generous emergency response. 79 A number of countries have special calamity funds to cover the additional costs of reconstruction (e.g. India, the Philippines and Colombia), while some in Latin America and the Caribbean make special mention of municipal-level support for risk reduction. 80 Social funds and public works programmes are more normally associated with large-scale rural disasters as mechanisms for supporting livelihoods; but they have potential for urban areas too. In Nicaragua, following Hurricane Mitch in 1998, social fund financing was released through four regional offices and used to build shelter, water and sanitation systems, and bridges. This was essential for enabling critical services and market access to smaller towns and rural settlements. 81 Like national governments, bilateral and multilateral donors, including international development banks, have a history of supporting disaster reconstruction. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the UNDP, the World Bank and the African Development Bank all have policies covering natural disasters and implement projects in this area. Only the UNDP funds relief; but all are active in reconstruction. With the exception of the African Development Bank, disaster reconstruction can be funded by drawing on funding already allocated to development projects. The World Bank’s approach to disasters, for instance, has tended to be reactive rather than tactical (see Box 8.16). Disasters have been treated as interruptions in development rather than as a risk that is integral to development. Few Country Assistance Strategies or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) supported by the World Bank mention disaster risk. Recent initiatives, notably by the IDB, the Caribbean Development Bank, the DFID and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), among others, indicate a reappraisal and recognition of the value of investing in risk reduction. For example, in 2006, the DFID committed to allocating approximately 10 per cent of its
Policy responses to disaster risk 213 Box 8.16 World Bank funding for disaster risk reduction and reconstruction As a proportion of World Bank lending, disaster lending has increased from 6 per cent during the period of 1984 to 1988 to 14 per cent from 1999 to 2003. Four times as much disaster lending is spent in rural than urban areas. Emergency recovery loans (ERLs) provided under the World Bank’s Emergency Recovery Assistance Policy are made available to countries undertaking disaster reconstruction. ERLs were first adopted during 1970 following an earthquake in Peru. These loans are intended for recovery from natural and human-made disasters, but also economic shocks following biological and political events, such as foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks and political violence, including terrorism. However, a large amount of the World Bank’s disaster response lending takes place outside of ERLs. For instance, only 2 out of 95 fire-related projects and 23 out of 59 earthquake-related activities are ERLs. ERLs are disadvantaged since they are limited to a threeyear timeframe. This has led to delays in implementation because projects that could benefit from attention to social and economic concerns have been prepared too quickly. Current policy does not support the purchase of consumables that might be used for disaster relief. This closes an opportunity for supporting countries hit by catastrophic events, such as the incapacitation of major and capital cities, which are beyond the capacity of governments, bilaterals and humanitarians to support. The World Bank has shown some flexibility by financing temporary shelter programmes in Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, India and Turkey, as well as cash transfers to earthquake-affected populations in Chile in 1985, Source: World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2006 Turkey in 1999, and in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. In addition to ERLs, World Bank emergency assistance is available through reallocation, redesign of pipeline projects, freestanding mitigation projects and assessments. This provides some useful flexibility for countries. What is missing is a mechanism for providing rapid lending for relief that does not involve opportunity costs over the medium term. The World Bank is good at supporting infrastructure reconstruction, but neglects the support for social organization that is necessary for building sustainability into investments. This observation might be linked to the failure of many projects to incorporate the findings of disaster prevention studies that have been commissioned as part of the project. Of 197 projects focusing on disaster mitigation or prevention, 142 included such studies, but only 54 took these studies into account. Recent work in the World Bank has moved in a positive direction and begun to embrace prevention and mitigation to include non-structural measures, such as institution building for hazard management, land-use planning, enforcement of building codes and insurance mechanisms. But more work is still to be done. In particular, challenges remain in supporting institutions and developing lending tools that encourage maintenance of investments; in reviewing procurement strategies that do not go through competitive bidding; in coordinating between donors, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and in strengthening community level involvement and capacity. Private sector insurance is important as a means of financing reconstruction funding for natural disaster response to prepare for and mitigate the impact of future disasters, where this can be done effectively. The DFID expects this new financial support to be particularly relevant for sudden onset disasters and it will only apply to responses that will cost more than UK£500,000. 82 Large-scale urban disasters are likely to fall within this new scheme. United Nations organizations (notably, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery at UNDP and UN-Habitat) and some international NGOs, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and Tearfund, have championed the risk reduction agenda. These organizations are active in lobbying internationally for risk reduction and have emphasized the need for risk reduction in urban contexts. Private-sector insurance is important as a means of financing reconstruction and as a source of foreign currency with which to offset balance of payments deficits during the reconstruction period. 83 Insurance companies have also been active in promoting secure building practices. In areas of high potential loss, private-sector insurance has been underwritten or replaced by government insurance. This is the case in the US, where Florida’s catastrophe fund reimburses insurers when disaster losses exceed set levels. 84 DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECONSTRUCTION This section reviews the roles played by local authorities and others, including local people and international agencies, during response and reconstruction phases of disaster. In particular, the aim of this section is to review the challenges to ‘building back better’ during these phases. First, issues of common concern to response and reconstruction are discussed and then each phase is reviewed in more detail. The role of local authorities Municipal authorities and local government are well placed to coordinate emergency response and reconstruction. They can link response and reconstruction to pre-disaster development goals and, indeed, can provide a forum for pre-disaster development goals to be reappraised in light of the disaster event. Table 8.1 describes the core activities of local authorities during response and reconstruction phases. There is a good degree of overlap in basic roles such as assessment for planning, coordination with civil society and other government agencies, liaising with international agencies, monitoring progress, establishing lines of finance, reviewing performance and providing public information. The distinction between relief and reconstruction is even less clear on Municipal authorities and local government are well placed to coordinate emergency response and reconstruction
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ENHANCING URBAN SAFETY AND SECURITY
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First published by Earthscan in the
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INTRODUCTION Enhancing Urban Safety
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The preparation of
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x Enhancing Urban Safety and Securi
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xii Enhancing Urban Safety and Secu
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xvi Enhancing Urban Safety and Secu
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xviii Enhancing Urban Safety and Se
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LIST OF FIGURES, BOXES AND TABLES F
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4 Understanding Urban Safety and Se
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1 CHAPTER CURRENT THREATS TO URBAN
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2 CHAPTER VULNERABILITY, RISK AND R
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Vulnerability, risk and resilience:
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29 simply ‘give up’ in the face
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46 Urban crime and violence Box II.
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48 Urban crime and violence it has
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50 Urban crime and violence Formal
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52 Urban crime and violence Contact
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54 Urban crime and violence Per 100
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56 Urban crime and violence Burglar
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58 Urban crime and violence Percent
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60 Urban crime and violence Figure
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62 Urban crime and violence Table 3
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64 Urban crime and violence Youth g
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68 Urban crime and violence Type of
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70 Urban crime and violence From a
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72 Urban crime and violence One vio
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74 Urban crime and violence High ho
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76 Urban crime and violence Abused
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78 Urban crime and violence General
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82 Urban crime and violence porate
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4 CHAPTER URBAN CRIME AND VIOLENCE:
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86 Urban crime and violence UN-Habi
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88 Urban crime and violence Box 4.2
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90 Urban crime and violence Box 4.4
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92 Urban crime and violence Legisla
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94 Urban crime and violence above w
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96 Urban crime and violence Campaig
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98 Urban crime and violence Availab
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100 Urban crime and violence Box 4.
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102 Urban crime and violence In som
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104 Urban crime and violence Initia
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106 Urban crime and violence The mo
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108 Urban crime and violence Vander
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112 Security of tenure Box III.1 Se
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5 CHAPTER SECURITY OF TENURE: CONDI
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116 Security of tenure Table 5.1 A
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118 Security of tenure Fully legal
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120 Security of tenure Box 5.4 Secu
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122 Security of tenure Urban tenure
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124 Security of tenure At least 2 m
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126 Security of tenure Market-based
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128 Security of tenure Box 5.11 Urb
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130 Security of tenure Operation Mu
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132 Security of tenure Control of l
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134 Security of tenure Box 5.18 Sec
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136 Security of tenure NOTES 1 Habi
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138 Security of tenure Box 6.1 The
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140 Security of tenure It would be
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142 Security of tenure Box 6.7 Land
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144 Security of tenure Box 6.10 Wha
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146 Security of tenure Box 6.12 Evi
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148 Security of tenure Box 6.15 Con
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150 Security of tenure Box 6.18 Vio
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152 Security of tenure The
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154 Security of tenure Box 6.24 Lan
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156 Security of tenure The state is
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158 Security of tenure Housing righ
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11 CHAPTER ENHANCING TENURE SECURIT
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264 Towards safer and more secure c
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12 CHAPTER MITIGATING THE IMPACTS O
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304 Summary of case studies Since i
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306 Summary of case studies • The
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308 Summary of case studies tions w
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310 Summary of case studies environ
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312 Summary of case studies others.
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314 Summary of case studies purpose
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316 Summary of case studies These e
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318 Summary of case studies develop
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320 Summary of case studies tion ex
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322 Summary of case studies Housing
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324 Summary of case studies Prolong
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326 Summary of case studies momentu
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330 Statistical annex Islands, Micr
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332 Statistical annex NOMENCLATURE
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334 Statistical annex Population, u
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336 Statistical annex SOURCES OF DA
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410 TABLE C.7 continued Enhancing U
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INDEX ACHR (Asian Coalition for Hou
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Index 435 security of tenure 134 co
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Index 437 domestic abuse see intima
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Index 439 hazard management 169 haz
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Index 441 Kosovo, security of tenur
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Index 443 participation 38, 296-299
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Index 445 individual 34-35 municipa
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Index 447 gun ownership 78 Homeless
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