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STRATEGISCHE BETEKENIS 383
SUMMARY
STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
New Guinea is no exception on the general rule that the strategic significance
of any territory depends upon constant and varying factors. The former are the
geographical site and the climatological conditions, the latter the political situation
at home and abroad, the economic development, the technological advance
especially the military one, the ethnological relations, the physical conditions of
the territory, its raw materials developed and undeveloped. As some varying
factors have considerably changed the strategic importance of New Guinea in
the last decennary, it is necessary to analyze these factors before confronting
them with the constant factors in order to formulate conclusive conceptions.
Before 1942 the political situation in the Pacific was dominated by the feud
between opposing sea powers, nowadays between a combination of continental
powers and of sea powers. The continental power is trying to extend its sphere
of influence over the continent of Asia. As a result of the weak political and
military south-east-Asiatic powers there exists a serious possibility of reaching
the shores of the Straits of Malacca by the continental power in the early days of
a world conflict if not before.
The maritime powers are trying to build a front of islands facing the continental
threat from the Aleutians via Japan, Formosa, the Philippines to the Indian
Archipelago. The withdrawal of the Dutch sovereignty and military power from
Indonesia created a strategic vacuum on the south side of the Philippines. The
neutral attitude of the Indonesian government in the East-West contrast, causes
a very dubious political and strategical vacuum for the coming ten years in this
very important Archipelago. As a result the Philippines, instead of being a central
bastion, tend to be a saillant with an exposed south flank, with the possibility
New Guinea coming in first line forming an important link with Australia and
with the American main base via the south Pacific eastward.
Consequently New Guinea with its many bays, rivermouths and creeks may
become a possible hiding base for submarines, seaplanes and raiders endangering
the communications from America and Australia with the island front in the
Western Pacific. Inversely land- en seaborn air- and seacraft based on New Guinea
can assist in the safeguarding of the above mentioned communications. Moreover
New Guinea is the advanced guard of the defense of the Australian mainland.
Especially the highly economically developed eastcoast of Australia would be
seriously endangered by an infiltration via western to eastern New Guinea (Port
Moresby).
By all these reasons America and Australia cannot be uninterested neither for
possible communistic infiltration nor for the conditions of defense preparedness