Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
under current circumstances is improbable.
3. Therefore, on a cost benefit analysis the costs to the US of sharing technology
with Europe in terms of Western leadership, markets, etc., are not likely to be great. On
the other hand, the benefits could be considerable. The principal gain would be psychological.
US initiatives would be regarded as an act of good will—a cooperative gesture
from a friend and ally—which would further strengthen Atlantic bonds. It would encourage
US/Europe scientific and industrial cooperation and neutralize any tendency to turn
to the USSR in frustration. It would tend to still those voices which charge that US policies
are directed to establishing and maintaining absolute domination in all advanced
areas of technology.
4. To a lesser degree US technological cooperation, to the extent that it would assist
Europe to maintain a reasonably competitive position, will increase specialization and
trade for the benegit [sic] of both sides.
5. Turning now to the specific case of communication satellite technology, much of
the above reasoning applies. The advantages to the US of relaxing its objectives is for a
substantial US share in a single global communications satellite system. Such psychological
factors could well be important. The ambitions of European industry in obtaining a
larger share of the INTELSAT contracts are well known. Both industry and government
regard communications satellites as the one sector of space investment which promises an
early commercial return. Informed Europeans are aware that current US policies prevent
European industry from obtaining the know-how which they feel would permit them to
compete for and obtain such contracts. Much of the recent publicity in Europe released
by industry supporting the concept of regional communications satellite systems, allegedly
complementary with the global system, is believed primarily designed to provide Europe
a greater share of the market for satellites and other elements of the commercial system.
The European Conference on Satellite Communications (CETS) is meeting in The
Hague later this month with the specific objective of improving European capabilities in
satellite technology. Certainly regional systems will be examined as one means of achieving
this objective. While France may favor regional systems as an end in themselves, it is
believed most countries are basically concerned with industrial aspects and are [3] quite
content with [a] single system concept so long as they obtain [a] fair slice of the equipment
cake. Thus, if Europeans feel that the US policies and predominance in a single
global system will continue to frustrate what they feel to be their quite legitimate aspirations
on production, they may well seek to negotiate an agreement at the 1969
Conference which would permit the establishment of regional systems.
6. It is recognized that there is fear that the relaxation of restrictions on transfer of
satellite technology will give Europeans the tools to establish separate systems. In our view
this fear is exaggerated. First of all, as mentioned above, the general European objective
is to achieve adequate competence to bid for INTELSAT and possibly IDCSP [Initial
Defense Communications Satellite Program] contracts, and not to establish independent
systems per se. This is particularly true of the British. Second, the possibility appears
remote that the Europeans could launch an independent system by 1969. Aside from the
question of satellite development, Europe will not have launch capability until well into
the 1970’s.
7. To conclude on this point, an offer to share communications technology with
Europe would gain a measure of good will and serve to alleviate European suspicions of
US intentions. This should improve the US negotiating posture in 1969. On the other
hand the danger to US objectives in such a move would, in practical terms, be negligible
since the Europeans would be unable to use such technology over the short term to
launch an independent system.
8. Answers to the specific questions posed in the final paragraph of reference