Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 569
[10] A broader attempt to limit the wholesale dissemination of unclassified NASA technology
was initiated in 1973 in response to two stimuli: (1) the suggestion in some congressional
forums that NASA was a major conduit of technology to competitors of the
United States, and (2) the possibility that the supercritical wing, as a valuable US technology,
may have been compromised by early open publication.
The FEDD program was the result. 2 It provides for identifying certain technology as
having possible early and significant commercial potential, then marking any documentation
on that technology For Early Domestic Dissemination. Efforts to benefit US industry
and defer general availability to foreign industry then could be implemented for the
technology so identified. The Departments of State and Commerce were consulted and
endorsed the program as a desirable experiment.
Similar controls on the COSMIC computer software distribution program were adopted
recently. 3 These regulations call for the identification of computer programs by their
potential commercial usefulness. Restrictions on distribution to foreign nationals are
placed on the most critical software programs for a designated period of years. Less critical
programs may be exchanged or sold.
The transfer of NASA-generated technology is further controlled in the context of
international cooperative space programs. It is a general precondition of such programs
that the foreign partner have the essential technological capability required to discharge
the responsibilities which he undertakes in the cooperative agreement. Then, where
appropriate, it is specified that in the event that the foreign partner discovers a need for
technical assistance, NASA may refer that need to commercial sources in the US (where
it becomes subject to export controls). NASA also reserves the right to require that any
technical assistance given be provided in “black box” form (as end product rather than
[11] technology). In general, however, there are relatively clean interfaces in international
space projects and the transfer of technological know-how is not involved or
required between the cooperating agencies. There is, however, substantial commercial
involvement directly with US aerospace companies (see section below).
A certain amount of discretion is exercised at both NASA Headquarters and field centers
with regard to the subject matter and treatment of technical papers to be presented
by NASA personnel abroad, thereby controlling in some degree transfer of know-how by
this means.
Also, NASA requires the field centers to report and clear invitations to foreign nationals
attending symposia. This requirement is informal and probably warrants formalization
and centralization.
There has been a change in administration of the NASA foreign resident research
associate program. The policy now in practice discourages associates in technical disciplines
in favor of those in scientific areas.
Finally, in connection with export controls discussed below, NASA, although not subject
to the Munitions Controls of the Department of State, nevertheless takes steps on
those rare occasions when technology transfer is contemplated, to assure through informal
coordination with the Office of Munitions Control that such transfer would be consistent
with government practice.
• Contracted Technology
Limitations on the export of contracted technology are essentially outside NASA’s
responsibilities, since the export of space technology by a private contractor falls under
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Act administered by the Office of Munitions
2. NASA NMI 2210.1 dated December 13, 1973.
3. NASA NMI 2210.2 dated April 24, 1978.