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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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Specifically, this report concludes that—<br />

(a) Additional international satellite facilities should be permitted by <strong>the</strong> FCC, provided<br />

<strong>the</strong>y satisfy conventional regulatory requirements, but <strong>the</strong> new entrants must be<br />

restricted to providing customized services, as defined in this report. When one or more<br />

authorities abroad authorizes use of such new systems, <strong>the</strong> United States with those<br />

authorities will enter into consultation procedures with INTELSAT under Article XIV(d)<br />

of <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT Agreement. Construction permits may be issued at <strong>the</strong> conclusion of<br />

regulatory proceedings to those applicants meeting <strong>the</strong> public interest requirements of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Communications Act. Final licenses and authorizations should not be issued, however,<br />

until after INTELSAT consultation is completed.<br />

(b) The FCC should examine allowing U.S. carriers and users in addition to <strong>the</strong><br />

Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) to have cost-based access to <strong>the</strong><br />

INTELSAT space segment for customized services. This matter can be pursued on a parallel<br />

track, as <strong>the</strong> pending applications are being processed, however, and does not constitute<br />

a condition to FCC action on <strong>the</strong>se applications.<br />

(c) The United States should, and will, maintain its full commitment to INTELSAT,<br />

while permitting technology-driven competition in this important sector to evolve. . . .<br />

[50] Conclusion<br />

EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 149<br />

The applications to establish additional international satellite systems now pending<br />

before <strong>the</strong> FCC presented four options. The Executive [branch] could have recommended<br />

(1) approval, (2) denial of <strong>the</strong> applications outright, (3) approval of <strong>the</strong> applications<br />

subject to specific qualifications, or (4) fur<strong>the</strong>r study, with postponement of any decision<br />

for an indefinite period. The unanimous view among <strong>the</strong> member agencies represented<br />

on <strong>the</strong> SIG is that it would be in <strong>the</strong> U.S. national interest to allow new providers of international<br />

satellite facilities, provided INTELSAT were not exposed to significant economic<br />

harm. The President’s determination reflects this view.<br />

There is sufficient risk of significant adverse economic impact on INTELSAT to make<br />

blanket approval of unrestricted competition unwise. It would also be premature to take<br />

such a step until <strong>the</strong> results of cost-based access, new fiber optic cables, and new<br />

INTELSAT services are fully evaluated. Unrestricted entry could ultimately undermine<br />

<strong>the</strong> economic integrity of this important international enterprise, which would be inconsistent<br />

with <strong>the</strong> U.S. national interest.<br />

[51] The case has not been made for flatly disapproving <strong>the</strong> existing applications. The<br />

new entrants have made a threshold showing that services <strong>the</strong>y propose are not now available<br />

on comparable terms. Limited entry along <strong>the</strong> lines recommended would fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />

U.S. international trade interests, promote technological progress, and be consistent with<br />

national defense and security interests as well. Given <strong>the</strong>se limitations, and <strong>the</strong> restrictions<br />

likely to be placed on any new satellite system by telecommunications authorities abroad,<br />

<strong>the</strong> risk of any significant adverse impact on INTELSAT is exceedingly small.<br />

Fur<strong>the</strong>r study and resulting delay [are] unlikely to fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> national interest. Over<br />

a year of extensive study and review by <strong>the</strong> Executive branch has already taken place. This<br />

review has not resulted in <strong>the</strong> submission of credible information supplied by anyone,<br />

including INTELSAT and Comsat, which demonstrates plausible adverse effects. There is<br />

no basis to assume such information will be forthcoming.<br />

Satellite systems entail significant lead time. Time is required to secure <strong>the</strong> requisite<br />

spacecraft, to reach launch agreements, and to secure operating arrangements. U.S. regulatory<br />

procedures are generally more time consuming than those abroad, where decisions<br />

can sometimes be reached and implemented without <strong>the</strong> regulatory proceedings<br />

and protracted court appeals characteristic of U.S. regulation. Consultation with<br />

INTELSAT is also required. Even were <strong>the</strong> pending applications approved by <strong>the</strong> FCC<br />

immediately, service would not be available for some time.

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