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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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572<br />

SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH<br />

technical advances from <strong>the</strong> industry, NASA should presumably leave those developments<br />

to <strong>the</strong> industry. Where national considerations of safety, environment, or strategic competition<br />

in <strong>the</strong> military or commercial fields becomes critical, or where <strong>the</strong> cost, risk and<br />

facilities for technical advance are beyond industry’s capacity in a competitive system,<br />

NASA as <strong>the</strong> government’s agent must consider filling <strong>the</strong> gap.<br />

In sum, it is difficult to conceive of a very different role for NASA than its traditional<br />

one in <strong>the</strong> development of aeronautical technology; however, its transfer to industry and<br />

defense must be responsive to national needs and international pressures on US industry.<br />

Fine tuning of <strong>the</strong> operating policies, of course, is always appropriate. Major innovations<br />

may be required for one-of-a-kind situations.<br />

– Space applications. The principal options are to leave <strong>the</strong> development of supporting<br />

and advancing technologies to operational interests once <strong>the</strong> operational stage is<br />

reached or, in <strong>the</strong> alternative, to continue technology development in some degree. What<br />

technology should NASA generate for transfer to <strong>the</strong> commercial sector? If a commercial<br />

industry exists, should we consider any fur<strong>the</strong>r development?<br />

The communications field provides a useful example. It is clear that <strong>the</strong> operational<br />

interests are indeed carrying forward R&D for much of <strong>the</strong>ir needs, <strong>the</strong>reby removing justification<br />

for government R&D in those particular areas. But <strong>the</strong>re are public interest<br />

areas where <strong>the</strong> private sector may have no motivation to do R&D. In communications<br />

<strong>the</strong>se areas include technological developments for conserving <strong>the</strong> spectrum and also for<br />

conserving <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> geosynchronous orbit.<br />

[17] It would <strong>the</strong>refore seem that NASA should consider continuing its R&D program<br />

(including test and demonstration projects) in such areas. These programs in <strong>the</strong> communications<br />

area should be carefully and narrowly defined. A positive answer should be<br />

contingent upon thorough advance discussion with those government agencies and<br />

potential user communities which may have real or fancied concerns in a given area to<br />

develop <strong>the</strong> necessary degree of support. Cost-benefit considerations should be included<br />

but (a) will often be very difficult to measure for not-yet-existing applications, and<br />

(b) should not necessarily be determinative in public interest areas in any case, since<br />

intangible values may be of overriding importance.<br />

Where NASA itself may be given operational responsibilities for space applications, as<br />

could occur in <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, NASA would, of course, determine <strong>the</strong> R&D requirements<br />

to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> user agencies, working in conjunction with <strong>the</strong>m.<br />

– Technology utilization, ASVT programs. The major options are to run a push program<br />

or a pull program. In ei<strong>the</strong>r case, NASA must, under <strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> Space Act, be prepared<br />

to transfer technology to public and private interests of this country in <strong>the</strong> most<br />

effective and appropriate way, whe<strong>the</strong>r for space or non-space applications. NASA’s experience<br />

to date seems abundantly clear that technology transfer is a sometimes slow and<br />

difficult-to-measure process. Energetic measures can be taken to speed-up <strong>the</strong> process by<br />

identifying possibilities, bringing <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> attention of possible users, organizing a body<br />

of data, establishing a retrieval system and, in many cases, testing and demonstrating <strong>the</strong><br />

applications. This is particularly true for <strong>the</strong> public sector (cities and states, e.g., and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

government agencies) where non-space needs may be strongly felt but <strong>the</strong> expertise required<br />

for adaption [sic], test, demonstration and implementation may be entirely lacking.<br />

At <strong>the</strong> same time, experience also suggests that <strong>the</strong> dangers of internal enthusiasms<br />

for applications in fields outside <strong>the</strong> agency’s experience and expertise dictate some measure<br />

[18] of conservatism. It would seem, <strong>the</strong>refore, that <strong>the</strong> agency should continue substantially<br />

along its present course but with greater visibility for management for <strong>the</strong> many<br />

non-space applications explored and tested.<br />

This means that both headquarters and centers should continue <strong>the</strong>ir initiatives and<br />

responses but that a system should be established to permit parallel awareness of specific

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