Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

570
SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH
Control of the State Department. The same applies to aeronautical technology of primarily
military character. Aeronautical technology of dual use [12] (military and civilian),
plus a very extensive list of other technologies covering sensors, data processing, communications
equipment, etc., is covered by Department of Commerce export controls. NASA
provides technical advice to both State and Commerce when requested and participates
in the development of lists of controlled items, but the responsibility for granting or denying
export licenses rests with those agencies.
If technical material is published (made generally available), it is considered to have
a general license for export and is not then controlled. Therefore, NASA and its contractors
have some responsibility to consider whether the publication of particular technical
data could compromise the intent of State and Commerce control activities. In this connection,
both the NASA patent program and the FEDD program, described above, are relevant
and apply to contracted technology as well as to in-house technology.
Since unilateral US export controls would obviously have little effect if a foreign purchaser
could simply turn to other nations for his needs, the United States has been active
in organizing COCOM, an effort of the NATO nations and Japan to concert their export
controls on critical items vis-à-vis the Communist world. This system is in some sense an
international projection of the US Munitions Control procedure, but suffers from considerable
differences of view and competitive pressures among the participating nations.
Finally, of course, NASA-contracted technology may be classified on defense grounds,
but this is relatively rare.
To generate advice for State or Commerce on specific export license requests, the
central coordinating point in NASA is the International Affairs Division. That Division
draws on the technical expertise of the entire agency for this purpose. The final recommendation
is treated according to general guidelines, contained in a policy paradigm
approved by the NASA Deputy Administrator several years ago. The guideline distinguishes
technical know-how from end product. Know-how which is uniquely available
from the US would presumptively [13] be denied export. But if the know-how is readily
available from other foreign sources, the presumption would be that US industry should
be allowed to compete. End products, whether uniquely available from the US or not, are
presumptively exportable unless unique know-how could be extracted from them. Of
course, there may be over-riding considerations where, e.g., an end product might be critical
to an objectionable end-use, as in the case of missile components destined for a country
thought to be developing a nuclear weapons delivery system, or in the case of a
computer whose capacity could be diverted to weapons system design. The policy paradigm,
which appears on the following page, has been incorporated in a classified
[National Security Decision Memorandum] as an available guideline for the government
as a whole.
DISCUSSION
• Issues
The principal questions which have been raised with respect to NASA policy and practice
in technology transfer, whether positive or restrictive, appear to be these:
– Should NASA be developing aeronautical technology for defense and for private
industry? To what extent and according to what criteria?
– What role should NASA play in stimulating the industrial R&D needed to produce
innovations consistent with national goals, and are significant changes needed in
current policies to maximize industry’s investment in this R&D?
– Similarly, in fields such as space communications and remote sensing, should
NASA be developing and promoting an advancing technology base for other agencies and
for private industry and under what criteria?