Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
The White House
Washington
February 8, 1967
I submit a proposed draft of the President’s 1966 report to the Congress as required
by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. This report emphasizes positive accomplishments.
It does not describe the hazards which INTELSAT and ComSat face. Some of
these hazards are:
a. Actions of certain international record carriers indicate that they consider it to be
in their corporate interest to emasculate INTELSAT, the single global system, and
ComSat.
b. Certain major aerospace manufacturers both here and abroad deprecate the
value of INTELSAT and the single global system. They favor many proliferating domestic
and regional systems. Obviously these would provide a larger market for their products.
c. [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in the original] France has been
promoting within Europe a regional communications satellite system which will compete
with INTELSAT, and will probably join the Soviet Molnya [sic: Molniya] system.
d. ComSat’s studies conclude that there is more business and earnings in the domestic
communications field than can be derived from international traffic. This conflict of
interest has been demonstrated in recent FCC filings where ComSat has failed to take a
clear-cut position as the servant of the international INTELSAT joint venture.
e. Certain members of INTELSAT who derive a favorable balance of payments
under present arrangements are not supporting the U.S. policy of actively encouraging
the establishment of satellite communications facilities for the developing nations. This
has resulted in inadequate progress toward the design of low cost earth terminals and
satellite systems—concepts which are needed to promote early effective and economical
use in the developing nations.
f. [bolded passages were highlighted with a marker in the original] Major continental
European nations are critical of the “excessively dominant” position of the United
States in the decisions of the International Consortium. Actions to reduce U.S. dominance
and to obtain a manager other than ComSat are expected during the 1969 negotiations to
extend the existing Interim Agreement or consummate a more permanent one.
[2] g. Action by the United States to embark upon separate domestic or regional enterprises
prior to 1969 will have a serious negative impact on the single global system, the
International Consortium, the 1969 renegotiations, and ComSat’s future as Manager for
INTELSAT.
h. The recent FCC action to adopt a 50-50 shared ground station ownership formula
between ComSat and the communications common carriers has not reduced conflict as
had been hoped. ComSat’s investment capital potential has been cut in half but the
record carriers still want more. A merger of ComSat with the six other U.S. international
carriers is becoming increasingly vital.
i. The general disorder of U.S. international telecommunications has been and is a
serious obstacle to progress in commercial communication satellites and is a threat to
their future. It is also creating increasing pressure to reverse the trend toward greater
Government use of the international common carriers and causing serious consideration
of programs to step up the capacity of the Government’s own communication satellite sys-