21.03.2013 Views

Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

32<br />

THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />

b. The Bell System, which formerly depended on radio for intercontinental<br />

phone circuits, has been investing heavily and profitably in long submarine<br />

cables; four in <strong>the</strong> past few years. The first trans-Atlantic phone cable provided<br />

thirty-six circuits (about 140 kc [kilocycle] bandwidth), cost about<br />

$30,000,000.00, and reportedly paid out in its first two years. A second trans-<br />

Atlantic cable soon will be placed in service at a reported cost of<br />

$40,000,000.00, presumably for a similar number of circuits. Tropospheric<br />

scatter radio chains are comparable in cost and are geographically constrained.<br />

c. Comparing <strong>the</strong> proposed satellite system ($5,000,000.00 for 4500 kc bandwidth)<br />

with submarine cable, it could carry up to thirty times as much traffic<br />

at one-sixth <strong>the</strong> investment!<br />

[2] 3. Converting “potential” into “actual” economic attractiveness will depend on<br />

acquiring communication traffic, most probably via cooperative agreement with one or<br />

more communication common carriers. General Telephone may be <strong>the</strong> best prospect<br />

(certainly a better one than <strong>the</strong> complacent Bell System) because it is trying to gain stature<br />

despite Bell’s long-distance monopoly. The proposed satellite system could bypass Bell<br />

land-lines in linking General’s east-coast and west-coast systems, in addition to giving it<br />

non-Bell circuits to Europe and o<strong>the</strong>r continents. General Telephone also could negotiate<br />

more efficiently with <strong>the</strong> communication services of o<strong>the</strong>r countries and even o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

domestic companies (Western Union, etc.) than [Hughes Aircraft] could; not being a<br />

common carrier. This and related market survey problems seemed too sensitive to be<br />

explored adequately by <strong>the</strong> engineers of this task force, even if time and suitable contracts<br />

had been available. General Telephone need not be <strong>the</strong> only potential partner, of course,<br />

for even a smaller common carrier might supply enough traffic to get started. As few as six<br />

circuits (30 kc out of <strong>the</strong> available 4500 kc) to Europe should justify a five-million-dollar<br />

investment in proportion to submarine telephone cables.<br />

4. . . . (15 October [Interdepartmental Correspondence] from Lutz to Haeff,<br />

Jerrems) lists three questions which define <strong>the</strong> scope of <strong>the</strong> market survey believed to be<br />

desirable. To this list should be added a study of <strong>the</strong> relative costs and outage times for<br />

splicing a broken cable vs replacing a dead satellite repeater. As a preliminary estimate,<br />

keeping a launching in readiness on Jarvis Island should be less expensive than keeping a<br />

cable ship in readiness and a new satellite could be put up in hours, instead of <strong>the</strong> weeks<br />

required to locate and repair a cable-break.<br />

5. Technical aspects of <strong>the</strong> proposed program have been evaluated in more detail,<br />

and with higher confidence in <strong>the</strong> conclusions, than was possible with <strong>the</strong> preceeding<br />

[sic] economic aspects. The crux of <strong>the</strong> technical attractiveness of this program (and an<br />

important economic consideration as well) lies in quick-reaction capability at low cost. By<br />

being able to keep <strong>the</strong> weight of a simple broad-band repeater payload below 25 lbs, it can<br />

be put in stationary orbit by an inexpensive (one-third million dollars) solid-fuel Scout<br />

booster. Everyone else (NASA, RCA, Space Electronics, Signal Corps) has viewed a stationary<br />

orbit repeater as a more sophisticated, hence heavier device, with attitude control<br />

to use high gain antenna beams on <strong>the</strong> satellite. More payload weight requires a larger<br />

liquid-fueled rocket and severe logistic problems in transporting or making liquid oxygen<br />

for an equatorial launch. The alternative of launching from <strong>the</strong> U.S. and “dog-legging”<br />

into an equatorial orbit increases guidance problems and requires Saturn thrusts. Thus,<br />

NASA and o<strong>the</strong>rs consider <strong>the</strong> stationary orbit communications repeater as a high-cost<br />

program for 1965-70. This Task Force has convinced itself of <strong>the</strong> feasibility of puttin [sic]<br />

25 lbs, or possibly 30 lbs, into a useful quasi-stationary orbit with a Scout booster, of achieving<br />

a 4500 kc bandwidth repeater within this weight and of doing this within a year of <strong>the</strong><br />

date that full funding is provided.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!