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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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116<br />

THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />

<strong>the</strong> assembly should be <strong>the</strong> only competent parties to an arbitration proceeding. The<br />

majority of <strong>the</strong> delegations wanted to include in <strong>the</strong> intergovernmental agreement some<br />

mechanism for settling disputes among <strong>the</strong> governments[’] parties to that agreement.<br />

With respect to <strong>the</strong> selection of <strong>the</strong> panel members, <strong>the</strong> Working Group’s report, which<br />

was adopted by Committee II, stated that a majority favored selection of <strong>the</strong> panel by <strong>the</strong><br />

Assembly without weighted voting. This was inconsistent with <strong>the</strong> U.S. position that <strong>the</strong><br />

selection should be made by <strong>the</strong> board of governors. As for <strong>the</strong> scope of arbitrable disputes,<br />

<strong>the</strong> U.S. position that <strong>the</strong> scope should be confined to legal disputes received<br />

majority support, although some delegations favored a broader scope. The majority<br />

favored limiting <strong>the</strong> scope to legal disputes but using a different formulation from that<br />

proposed by <strong>the</strong> U.S.<br />

Amendment Processes—The U.S. position that a proposed amendment to <strong>the</strong> operating<br />

agreement be approved by <strong>the</strong> board of governors was opposed by several delegates.<br />

Although <strong>the</strong>re was general agreement that no amendment to <strong>the</strong> operating agreement<br />

should be made [14] without <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> parties to <strong>the</strong> intergovernmental agreement,<br />

differing views were expressed as to <strong>the</strong> manner in which that consent should be<br />

manifested.<br />

Liability of <strong>the</strong> Signatories—This matter was discussed only in <strong>the</strong> full Committee. A<br />

significant issue was whe<strong>the</strong>r, if INTELSAT is given separate legal status, <strong>the</strong> signatories<br />

would or should enjoy limited liability for INTELSAT obligations. There was significant<br />

opinion that limited liability automatically followed from establishing INTELSAT with<br />

legal personality. The U.S., along with Australia and Sweden, felt that it would not.<br />

However, Sweden and a number of o<strong>the</strong>r delegations expressed <strong>the</strong> view that limited liability<br />

is an advantage which should be afforded <strong>the</strong> signatories. A second issue was<br />

whe<strong>the</strong>r exemption of <strong>the</strong> signatories to <strong>the</strong> operating agreement from inter se liability<br />

should extend beyond consequential damages arising from a breakdown in service. There<br />

was general agreement that <strong>the</strong> definitive arrangements should not impair member states’<br />

responsibilities under <strong>the</strong> Treaty on Outer Space.<br />

Withdrawal, Reservations, Definitions and Number of Agreements—Withdrawal was<br />

discussed only briefly in Committee II. No general agreement was discernible.<br />

The matters of reservations and definitions were deferred until <strong>the</strong> final text of <strong>the</strong><br />

agreement has been generally established. There appeared to be no opposition at this<br />

time to <strong>the</strong> U.S. position prohibiting reservations.<br />

An overwhelming majority supported <strong>the</strong> U.S. position for two agreements, with some<br />

delegates reserving until more is known of <strong>the</strong> final text.<br />

Committee III—Financial Arrangements<br />

Committee III’s work program is shown in Annex E. Its report is Doc. 16.<br />

[15] There was general agreement in <strong>the</strong> Committee that investment in <strong>the</strong> system should<br />

be related to use, as <strong>the</strong> U.S. had proposed, though some countries, principally <strong>the</strong> Arab<br />

group, favored applying <strong>the</strong> investment/use system only after allocating a base share of<br />

investment to each member. There was near agreement on a minimum share for each<br />

member, regardless of its use of <strong>the</strong> system, most delegations favoring 0.05%. However,<br />

many delegations thought members with lower use should not be required to accept this<br />

minimum.<br />

The Committee divided three ways on <strong>the</strong> question of what types of use of <strong>the</strong> system<br />

should be counted in determining investment shares, about one-third of those countries<br />

that expressed views (including <strong>the</strong> U.S.) favoring all use of INTELSAT-financed facilities,<br />

one-third favoring international traffic only, and ano<strong>the</strong>r group proposing to count international<br />

traffic and that domestic traffic that crosses international boundaries (or would<br />

do so if projected on <strong>the</strong> surface of <strong>the</strong> earth). The ideas of several delegations on this<br />

question clearly were related to <strong>the</strong> question of voting strength in <strong>the</strong> organization. It was

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