Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 113
structure of the organization. The Working Group discussed and reported on the nature,
composition and functions of the major organs of the organization including an assembly
of members, a governing body and a manager. No draft articles were prepared although
a number of proposed drafts were submitted to the group and are reflected in the report.
The eighteen-country group attempted to identify and record alternative views on structure
of the organization but did not attempt to negotiate or reconcile inconsistent or
incompatible proposals.
There was unanimous support for creating an assembly, but the question arose as to
its composition. Some thought the assembly should be exclusively a governmental body
(i.e. participants would be under direct government control), and others suggested it be
an assembly of telecommunication operating agencies or entities which are the signatories
to the operating or special agreement. The United States, India and the United
Kingdom, among others, proposed that the designation of delegations to the assembly be
reserved as a matter of discretion of the individual member countries. An alternative solution
proposed was to divide the assembly into [8] two assemblies, (1) an assembly of governments,
meeting less regularly and concerning itself only with review of programs and
progress and possible amendment of the intergovernmental agreement, and (2) an
assembly of telecommunication operating entities, meeting more regularly, perhaps,
annually, to oversee and consider the management and progress of the system.
There was considerable discussion on the powers of the assembly, and proposals
range, in substance, from treating the assembly as the equivalent of a stockholders’ meeting
to giving the assembly direct responsibility and decision-making powers relating to
operation of the system. The broadest support probably is for the relatively less operationally
responsible assembly, and proponents of increased assembly powers are fewer as
the powers assigned increase. There are two schools of thought on voting in the assembly.
Nearly all of those speaking on the point favored one nation-one vote, in many cases, however,
subject to the assumption that the assembly will have relatively limited powers. The
United States position was to combine one nation-one vote with a weighted vote reflecting
relative levels of investment of the members.
There was unanimous opinion in the Committee favoring establishment of a governing
body equivalent to the present Interim Communications Satellite Committee (ICUS)
of INTELSAT. It was unanimously agreed that representatives to this body should be from
the telecommunication operating entities involved. There was a consensus that the size of
the body should be limited in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness, although all
agreed that equitable arrangements should be made for representation from smaller
member countries and all geographical areas. There was no consensus on how to achieve
these goals. There also was no specific agreement on functions of the governing body, but
it appeared to be intended by most delegations that its functions would be similar in
nature and scope to those now performed by the ICUS. Voting in the governing body was
discussed without [9] conclusions. There is general agreement that voting should be
weighted to reflect relative investment in or use of the system, but there appears to be substantial
support for the view that no single country or small group of countries (2 or 3)
should be able to impose or block (veto) a decision of the governing body. (The U.S. currently
has an effective veto power under the interim arrangements.)
The Working Group reported three principal views on the management arrangements
for the future organization and the proponents and supporters of each view proclaimed
their desire to ensure efficient, competent management.
The proponents of the first view maintained that the definitive arrangements should
establish a firm goal of full internationalization of the management, under a director general,
within a specific period of time. This view was supported by Belgium, France, India,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany, among others.
The proponents of the second view, while not excluding the possibility of partial or