Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

34
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
bility of bandwidth reapportionment between earth-terminals in accordance with shifting
relative traffic loads. In short, this approach overcomes the “two at a time” limitation of
most prior proposals and thus approached more closely the eventual many-user
“exchange in orbit” concept. Furthermore, it accomplishes this without sacrificing television
capability, requiring only that other traffic be limited during a television program and
be kept out of the television band.
[4] 10. Determination and resolution of possible legal and political problems and governmental
restrictions obviously is beyond the scope of this Task Force. A few of the possible
problems will be mentioned. The usual difficulties with the Federal Communications
Commission can be expected in obtaining a license for a new type radio service for frequencies
have not yet been allocated. Similar, or worse, difficulties can be expected with
the corresponding regulatory bodies of other nations where earth-terminals are located.
Characteristically, the FCC makes no precedent-setting decisions without holding industry-wide
hearings and these could be competitively detrimental. Furthermore, the State
Department might become involved because of the international nature of this venture.
Next, some governmental agency probably has control of Jarvis Island and would insist on
approving its use. Finally, NASA probably would have to sanction the commercial sale and
use of Scout boosters and could impose other controls on the program, such as requiring
provision for removing dead repeaters from orbit, or provision for disabling their electronics
in event that the project is abandoned with repeaters still in orbit. As a ray of sunshine,
NASA’s mission is non-military space technology. They have expressed
encouragement toward commercial projects which would not require NASA funds. If
NASA becomes “sold” on the proposed project, they might provide inestimable assistance
in surmounting the other governmental obstacles. One recognizes that exploration by a
Hughes representative of the above governmental restrictions could readily “leak” to competitors,
or even to the press, and be highly detrimental. This danger can be avoided, it is
believed, by retaining a consultant to make this preliminary investigation without disclosing
his client or the details of the project.
11. The impact of the proposed program on the military services could be both good
and bad. It would be conclusive proof of Hughes’ competence to execute a major space
program and in Hughes’ confidence and initiative in undertaking it without governmental
funds. Thus, it should put us in better competitive position for managing future governmental
space projects. It could have a bad impact, however, in “showing up” the
inefficiency of military satellite programs.
12. It is known that Bell, RCA and probably other large companies recognize the
potential attractions of satellite communication and probably have program plans. It is
reasonable to assume that Bell would plan to invest several times the cost of the trans-
Atlantic cable in a big stationary orbit project, timed to the availability of big boosters, five
or ten years hence. Pressure for additional international circuits may lead them to
re-examine the feasibility of moving faster by using a smaller booster and lighter payload,
much as we propose. Certainly they could be expected to do this if they learned that their
chief competitor, General Telephone, planned such a program in cooperation with
Hughes. Most of the prestige value and a portion of the economic value would be sacrificed
if our communication satellite were not the first. This indicates the need for a quick
decision and a fast program under tight security.
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