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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 173<br />

iting Shuttle payloads to those requiring <strong>the</strong> unique characteristics of <strong>the</strong> Shuttle. 75 This<br />

caused NOAA to direct EOSAT to prepare for launch on an expendable launch vehicle.<br />

O<strong>the</strong>r disagreements between <strong>the</strong> administration and Congress delayed a decision to fund<br />

<strong>the</strong> Landsat system until <strong>the</strong> spring of 1988. 76 By that time, it had become fully apparent<br />

that <strong>the</strong> subsidy ($219 million) would cover only <strong>the</strong> development and construction of one<br />

spacecraft. The Reagan administration and Congress nearly terminated EOSAT’s operation<br />

of Landsats 4 and 5 several times for lack of a few million dollars of operating funds. 77<br />

Part of <strong>the</strong> difficulty arose because, in <strong>the</strong> 1980s, proponents of land remote sensing<br />

faced <strong>the</strong> same problem <strong>the</strong>y had experienced in <strong>the</strong> 1960s. No single agency was willing<br />

to commit funding ($15–30 million per year beyond EOSAT’s revenue from data sales) to<br />

continue system operations. Unlike <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellites, which NOAA operated to provide<br />

data for its own National Wea<strong>the</strong>r Service, <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce had no<br />

internal constituency for collecting remotely sensed land data. The Carter administration<br />

had selected NOAA because of <strong>the</strong> agency’s experience in operating <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite<br />

systems. Congress expressed only lukewarm interest in supporting NOAA’s long-term<br />

operation of Landsat. This lack of commitment to a continuously operated remote-sensing<br />

system undermined what little confidence data customers had in <strong>the</strong> Landsat system.<br />

Relatively few customers were willing to develop <strong>the</strong> necessary processing infrastructure<br />

and training programs or make o<strong>the</strong>r investments that depended on <strong>the</strong> routine delivery<br />

of Landsat data.<br />

NOAA and EOSAT expected to launch Landsat 6 in 1992, with <strong>the</strong> federal government<br />

providing most of <strong>the</strong> funding for building and launching <strong>the</strong> satellite. However,<br />

even if Landsat 6 successfully reached orbit and operated as designed for five years, this<br />

plan still left <strong>the</strong> United States with <strong>the</strong> prospect of entering <strong>the</strong> late 1990s with no capability<br />

to collect Landsat data. It soon became clear that even if <strong>the</strong> data market doubled<br />

or tripled, EOSAT would not earn sufficient revenue to build Landsat 7. To resolve growing<br />

concerns over <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, President Bush “directed <strong>the</strong><br />

National Space Council and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Office</strong> of Management and Budget to review options with<br />

<strong>the</strong> intention of continuing Landsat-type data collections after Landsat 6.” [II-37]<br />

The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992<br />

By <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, several circumstances led to <strong>the</strong> decision to return Landsat system<br />

operation to <strong>the</strong> government. First, <strong>the</strong> U.S. military made extensive use of Landsat and<br />

SPOT data to create maps used in planning and executing U.S. maneuvers during <strong>the</strong><br />

1991 Gulf War. 78 Second, Landsat proponents worried that failing to develop Landsat 7<br />

would give SPOT full control of <strong>the</strong> international market for multispectral satellite data.<br />

Third, global change researchers began to appreciate that <strong>the</strong> twenty-year Landsat data<br />

archive would allow <strong>the</strong>m to follow environmental change on parts of Earth’s surface.<br />

Fourth, <strong>the</strong> attempt to commercialize <strong>the</strong> Landsat system had faltered badly, and policy<br />

makers began to feel that no private company was soon likely to be able to provide equiv-<br />

75. The White House, “Statement on <strong>the</strong> Space Shuttle,” August 15, 1986, Space Policy Institute<br />

Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />

76. U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, “Future of Land Remote Sensing System<br />

(Landsat),” 91-685-SPR, pp. 6–7, Space Policy Institute Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Washington, DC.<br />

77. M. Mitchell Waldrop, “Landsat Commercialization Stumbles Again,” Science 246 (January 9,<br />

1987):155–56; Eliot Marshall, “Landsat: Cliff-hanging, Again,” Science (October 20, 1989): 321–22.<br />

78. B. Gordon, Statement before <strong>the</strong> U.S. House of Representatives, Joint Hearing of <strong>the</strong> Committee on<br />

Science, Space, and Technology and <strong>the</strong> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Scientific,<br />

Military, and Commercial Applications of <strong>the</strong> Landsat Program, Hearing Report 102-61, June 26, 1991.

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